King Pin? A Case Study of a Middle Market Drug Broker

Abstract

This paper provides a detailed case study of a small, but extremely busy, 'middle market' drug distribution network in the North of England. It derives from a larger

Trust among cybercriminals? Carding forums, uncertainty and implications for policing

“…As already mentioned, recent studies (Thomas and Martin 2006;Franklin et al 2007;Holt and Lampke 2010;Yip 2011) indicate that cybercriminals are extensively trading over the Internet with market-driven dynamics (Powell 1990). In essence, these "cyber-entrepreneurs" (Brenner 2002) are similar to the "free-trading entrepreneurs" engaged in drug dealing (Pearson and Hobbs 2003;Morselli 2001). Further similarities can be found in the ways they interact as both studies report that the structure of the organised crime studied is not of a hierarchical orientation but rather, "flexible networks and partnerships" (Pearson and Hobbs 2003: 344) between individual entrepreneurs who seek to "exploit specific types of entrepreneurial activities" (Brenner 2002: 45).…”

“…Therefore, the exchanges between cybercriminals, at least in the underground economy, do not place emphasis on thick trust (Khodyakov 2007) or bonding capital (Lo 2010), that is, the strong interpersonal relationships such as families and close friends 5 . Rather, their relationships are built on thin trust (Khodyakov 2007) and these weak ties (Granovetter 1973) provide unique access to resources and opportunities outside of their immediate social circles (Burt 2000;Hobbs 2001;Pearson and Hobbs 2003;Lo 2010;Granovetter 1973;Uzzi 1997). Therefore, for cybercriminals to develop weak ties in the underground economy, they must be able to overcome the obstacles imposed by CMC on the transmission of social information that is necessary for them to develop thin trust.…”

“…Since the aim of this paper is to address the structure of organised crime, the focus lies on the exchanges between the cyber-entrepreneurs (Brenner 2002;Morselli 2001;Hobbs 2003;Lo 2010). Transaction cost economics (TCE) is therefore a suitable framework for this study because it focuses on the structure of governance by examining the transactions between parties (Williamson 1979).…”

“…As proposed in various organised crime literatures (Cohen 1977;Pearson and Hobbs 2003;Hobbs 2001;Morselli and Petit 2007;McIllwain 1999;Van Calster 2006;Levi 2008;von Lampe and Johansen 2003;Lo 2010), the studying of organised crime should treat the relationships or "criminally exploitable ties" as the unit of analysis. This view is adopted in this paper.…”

“…Since the existence of a collaborative tie requires the presence of trust (Coleman 1993;Gambetta 2000;Dasgupta 2000;Weerman 2003) and trust requires the mitigation of uncertainties, it can be seen that uncertainties are obstacles to collaborations. By applying transaction cost economics (Williamson 1979;1991;1993), uncertainty is treated in this paper as a transaction cost to a collaborative tie and it is assumed that cybercriminals have rational incentives for minimising this cost, an assumption that is implicit in many organised crime literatures regarding network structures (Williams 1998;Hobbs 2001;Pearson and Hobbs 2003;Morselli 2001;Morselli and Petit 2007;Kenny 2007;Lo 2010). Since previous studies demonstrate that the underground economy is thriving, this implies that cybercriminals have been able to minimise this cost sufficiently so that they are able to collaborate.…”