King Canute and the ‘Problem’ of Structure and Agency: On Times, Tides and Heresthetics

Abstract

The story of King Canute (Cnut) is well known. Indeed, in perhaps its most familiar form it exists as an oral historical tradition passed from generation to generation. In this almost legendary account, King Canute is depicted as an arrogant ruler, so confident as to his own omnipotence that he takes on the forces of nature, pitting his own powers against those of the rising tide – his wet robes paying testament to his powerlessness in the face of potent material forces and to the triumph of (natural) structures over (human) agency. Or so it might seem. In this article I suggest that even in this, the simplest depiction of the story of Canute, the relationship between structure and agency is more complex and involved than it appears. This complexity is only accentuated if we turn from the legend to the historical evidence. Moreover, by reflecting on Canute's practical negotiation of the ‘problem’ of structure and agency we can not only gain an interesting political analytical purchase on a seemingly familiar tale, but we can also generate a series of valuable and more general insights into our understanding of the structure–agency relationship. In particular, the (various) stories of King Canute and the waves alert us to the need: (1) to maintain a clear distinction between the empirical and the ontological; (2) to resist the temptation to attempt an empirical adjudication of ontological issues (or, indeed, an ontological adjudication of empirical issues); (3) to differentiate clearly between the capacities of agents with respect to material/physical structures on the one hand, and social/political structures on the other; (4) to acknowledge the significance of unintended consequences; (5) to attend to the ‘performative’ dimensions of agency; and (6) to recognise the dangers inherent in an overly instrumental view of actors' motivations and intentions.

The question of EU legitimacy in the Social OMC peer review process

“…constitutional edicts) to semi-rigid structures (policy instruments) to informal, but still institutionalized ideas (constitutional conventions or traditions). Hay (2009) further differentiates between structures that can be shaped by the actors within the structure and those that do 'not include the opportunity to reconfigure the rules governing the operation of the system itself' (p. 266). The Social OMC, as an actor-driven process, clearly fits into the former type.…”

Morphogenetic theory and the constructivist institutionalist challenge

“…Beyond his analytical duality between strategic actor and strategically selective context, Hay makes two further distinctions. Firstly, there is a distinction between the natural context and the social context, where the former is independent of our knowledge and understanding of it, while the latter is constituted by that knowledge and understanding (Hay, , ). Secondly, building on the social ontology of John Searle (, , ), Hay argues for a distinction between the institutional context and ideational context, where the former is dependent on knowledge but exists independently of conscious thought on a day‐to‐day basis, while the latter exists as conscious thought and only exists “as long as our thoughts are of a particular kind” (Hay, , p. 522).…”

“…Secondly, building on the social ontology of John Searle (, , ), Hay argues for a distinction between the institutional context and ideational context, where the former is dependent on knowledge but exists independently of conscious thought on a day‐to‐day basis, while the latter exists as conscious thought and only exists “as long as our thoughts are of a particular kind” (Hay, , p. 522). These three distinctions seem to be the foundational tenets of constructivist institutionalism and can be summarised as follows: the strategic actor can be distinguished from the strategically selective context (Hay, ); within the strategically selective context, a further distinction can be made between the natural context and the social context (Hay, ); within the social context, a final distinction can be made between the institutional and the ideational context (Hay, ). The elegance of these three layered distinctions is a strength of the constructivist institutionalist approach, but the ontological status of these distinctions remains a problematic ambiguity.…”

‘Cabined, cribbed, confined, bound in’ or ‘we are not a government poodle’: Structure and agency in museums and galleries

“…This can be seen in both the large number of discussions of the ontological and epistemological bases underpinning possible understandings of the relationships between the two component elements of the debate (Hay & Wincott, 1998;Sibeon, 1999;Dowding, 2001, 97-100;Hay, 2002, 89-134;Lewis, 2002;McAnulla, 2005;Jessop, 2007;Hay, 2009aHay, , 2009bPleasants, 2009;Cruickshank, 2010), and in the increasing use of the structure-agency relationship as a means for undertaking forms of analysis of issues ranging from institutional racism (Wight, 2003), to democratisation in South Asia (Adeney & Wyatt, 2004), to local political participation (Lowndes et al, 2006) to British governance (Goodwin & Grix, 2011). These discussions may have their own intrinsic interest and, usually, lead to a clarification of the basic ground-rules under which substantive empirical analyses of the relationship of structure and agency can take place but they have generally been weak at developing the relationship between ontological and epistemological positions and the methodological consequences of them.…”

“…At this level empirical investigation assumes importance for providing information that can be used in the consideration of the relationships of key component parts of particular ontological positions, even if empirical evidence is not capable of determining whether these positions or relationships are 'correct' or not (Hay, 2009a;263). Analysis, instead, can be used for a variety of less absolute issues including the investigation of hypotheses, the making of predictions, the clarification of causal mechanisms (and so on) within the context of the particular sets of assumptions which are part and parcel of any given ontological position.…”