Key Recovery Attacks on Some Rank Metric Code-Based Signatures

Lau, Terry Shue Chien; Tan, Chik How; Prabowo, Theo Fanuela

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-35199-1_11

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…We will revisit the core concept of the LTP second attack proposed in [14] . This attack capitalizes on two aspects of the design of Schnorr-type signature schemes: The determination of whether a generated signature with a low rank inadvertently reveals any information about an extended support linked to the secret key.…”

Section: A New Approach To Recover Secret Keys Of the Durandal Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the RQCS signature scheme was successfully cryptanalyzed in [1] . Later on, generalization was made by Lau et al on the attack vector of SHMW signature scheme [1] , where the authors proposed two generic attacks (i.e., referred to as “LTP attacks”) on Schnorr-type rank metric signature schemes [14] . To be more precise, in LTP attacks, the objective is to derive either a basis for the original support of the secret key or a basis for extended support of the secret key based on the available signatures.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme

Lau,

Kamel Ariffin,

Yip

et al. 2024

Heliyon

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Section: A New Approach To Recover Secret Keys Of the Durandal Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme

Lau,

Kamel Ariffin,

Yip

et al. 2024

Heliyon

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“…In 2018, Bellini et al [8] proposed the rank metric version of the Veron and CVE identification protocols and DSS. However, Lau et al [9] showed that the rank Veron was insecure, as its secret key could be recovered in polynomial time. Nevertheless, Bellini et al [10] improved the rank Veron DSS and proposed another scheme, namely the RVDC identification protocol and DSS.…”

Section: Introduction 1literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rank AGS Identification Scheme and Signature Scheme

et al. 2023

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The identification protocol is a type of zero-knowledge proof. One party (the prover) needs to prove his identity to another party (the verifier) without revealing the secret key to the verifier. One can apply the Fiat–Shamir transformation to convert an identification scheme into a signature scheme which can be used for achieving security purposes and cryptographic purposes, especially for authentication. In this paper, we recall an identification protocol, namely the RankID scheme, and show that the scheme is incorrect and insecure. Then, we proposed a more natural approach to construct the rank version of the AGS identification protocol and show that our construction overcomes the security flaws in the RankID scheme. Our proposal achieves better results when comparing the public key size, secret key size, and signature size with the existing identification schemes, such as Rank RVDC and Rank CVE schemes. Our proposal also achieves 90%, 50%, and 96% reduction for the signature size, secret key size, and public key size when compared to the Rank CVE signature scheme.

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MURAVE: A New Rank Code-Based Signature with MUltiple RAnk VErification

Lau

Tan

2020

Code-Based Cryptography

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Key Recovery Attacks on Some Rank Metric Code-Based Signatures

Cited by 8 publications

References 12 publications

Cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme

Cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme

Rank AGS Identification Scheme and Signature Scheme

MURAVE: A New Rank Code-Based Signature with MUltiple RAnk VErification

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