Key management for content access control in a hierarchy

Hassen, Hani Ragab; Bouabdallah, Abdelmadjid; Bettahar, Hatem; Challal, Yacine

doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2006.12.011

Cited by 45 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…3a), then after the key renewal the keys (1) has not the same value for both cases after the membership change even if it had the same size, 3, before it. This is due to the fact that Z t (1) depends on the contents of the keys table, which is related to the process history, thus fulfilling the Markov property.…”

Section: A Markov Process Model For Ktlhmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Key management typical tasks are Resource Encryption Keys (REK) generation and renewal [1]. The REK renewal is necessary to ensure confidentiality when users join or leave the hierarchy.…”

Section: Key Management Schemes For Cachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The existing key management schemes for CACH can be divided into two approaches: the dependent-keys and the independent-keys approaches [1] as shown in Fig. 1.…”

Section: Key Management Schemes For Cachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is because having a distance of N to the next chain discontinuity means that there is no chain discontinuity but the one after SC N (by convention). This situation only happens when a user joins or leaves SC 1 . A join to SC 1 occurs with the rate ω 0,1 = 1 (N +1) 2 (i.e., from SC 0 to SC 1 , SC 0 is the set of external hosts).…”

Section: The Transition Matrix Of X T (C): Q(c)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These keys are called Resource Encryption Keys (REK). Key management for CACH aims at efficiently generating, distributing and renewing these keys while fulfilling the security requirements of content access control [1].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A key management scheme evaluation using Markov processes

Ragab-Hassen

Lounes

2016

Int. J. Inf. Secur.

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Content access control aims at ensuring that, in a system with several resources, users can only access resources they are authorized to. Resources are encrypted using cryptographic keys. Generating, distributing and renewing these keys are the challenges faced by key management schemes. While most of the existing key management schemes are typically evaluated by simulation. We propose, for the first time, to use Markovian processes for this purpose. Markovian processes give more accurate evaluation. The key tables-based key management scheme for linear hierarchies (KTLH) is a particularly interesting key management scheme; it was initially proposed for securing group communications, but could easily be adapted to other application such as wireless sensor networks. KTLH requires each user to maintain a set of keys. The keys and size of the key set change dynamically, making the evaluation of the overheads of KTLH a challenging task. Our contribution is threefold, we have (1) modeled KTLH using Markov processes, (2) evaluated KTLH according to its storage, computation and bandwidth overheads and compared it to existing key management schemes and (3) shown how our approach could be generalized to other key management schemes.

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Section: A Markov Process Model For Ktlhmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Key management typical tasks are Resource Encryption Keys (REK) generation and renewal [1]. The REK renewal is necessary to ensure confidentiality when users join or leave the hierarchy.…”

Section: Key Management Schemes For Cachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The existing key management schemes for CACH can be divided into two approaches: the dependent-keys and the independent-keys approaches [1] as shown in Fig. 1.…”

Section: Key Management Schemes For Cachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Transition Matrix Of X T (C): Q(c)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A key management scheme evaluation using Markov processes

Ragab-Hassen

Lounes

2016

Int. J. Inf. Secur.

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Key Management in Wireless Sensor Networks

Bekara¹,

Laurent²

2009

Wireless and Mobile Network Security

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We refer to a distributed architecture consisting of sensor nodes connected by wireless links and organized in a tree shaped hierarchy. We present a paradigm for the management of the cryptographic keys used by nodes to communicate, and we consider the problems connected with key generation, distribution, and replacement. In our paradigm, names are assigned to nodes by using a uniform scheme, which is based on the position of the given node in the node hierarchy. Each node holds a hierarchical key to communicate with its ancestors, and a level key to communicate with its siblings. A single, publiclyknown parametric one-way function is used to assign hierarchical keys to nodes, in an iterative procedure that starts from the key of the root of the node hierarchy, and proceeds downwards to the lowest hierarchical levels. A similar procedure is used to generate the level keys. The total memory requirements for key storage are extremely low. The number of keys exchanged in a key replacement process is kept to a minimum. Dynamic access control is fully supported, whereby new nodes can be added to the node hierarchy, and existing nodes can be evicted from the hierarchy.

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Enhancing identity trust in cryptographic key management systems for dynamic environments

Kayem

Martin

Akl

2010

Security Comm Networks

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Cryptographic key management (CKM) schemes can be used to support identity management (IM) systems where linking users securely to data objects is important. CKM schemes enforce data security by encrypting data granting access only to authorized users and security compromises are prevented by updating any keys that are held by users from whom access rights have been revoked. Handling key updates efficiently and providing security against collusion attacks is challenging in dynamic environments like the Internet where manual Security management increases the likelihood of delayed responses. Delay increases the system's vulnerability to security attacks and the potential of the system's violating its service level agreements. Adaptive CKM has emerged as a possibility of addressing this problem but needs to be designed in a way that justifies the cost/benefit tradeoff. In this paper, we show that the key update and collusion avoidance problems are NP-complete and need heuristic algorithms to prevent performance degradations in comparison to standard CKM schemes. As an example of the benefits of a good heuristic, we present a collusion detection and resolution algorithm whose running time is polynomial in the number of keys. The algorithm operates by mapping the generated key set onto a key graph whose independent set is computed. In the key graph, the vertices represent the keys and the edges the probability that their endpoints can be combined to provoke a collusion attack. Collusion possibilities are resolved by applying a heuristic that resets the probability to zero. The performance of our algorithm is analyzed in comparison to the Akl and Taylor scheme that is secure against collusion attack, and the experimental results indicate that collusion prevention can be done dynamically without affecting performance.

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Key management for content access control in a hierarchy

Cited by 45 publications

References 35 publications

A key management scheme evaluation using Markov processes

A key management scheme evaluation using Markov processes

Key Management in Wireless Sensor Networks

Enhancing identity trust in cryptographic key management systems for dynamic environments

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