2008
DOI: 10.1109/tit.2008.921689
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Key Distribution Protocols Based on Noisy Channels in Presence of an Active Adversary: Conventional and New Versions With Parameter Optimization

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Cited by 20 publications
(40 citation statements)
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“…Maurer and Wolf subsequently extended the secretkey sharing analysis of [21] to account for the presence of an active eavesdropper in [179]- [181], and showed that either a secret key can be generated at the same rate as in the passive-adversary case, or such secret-key agreement is infeasible. Refinements to their model that yield larger key rates are shown in [182]. A two-user interference channel with a noiseless, shared feedback channel from the receivers and corresponding bounds on the secret-key capacity region are studied in [183], while the multiple-access channel was examined in [184].…”
Section: Wireless Secret Key Agreementmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Maurer and Wolf subsequently extended the secretkey sharing analysis of [21] to account for the presence of an active eavesdropper in [179]- [181], and showed that either a secret key can be generated at the same rate as in the passive-adversary case, or such secret-key agreement is infeasible. Refinements to their model that yield larger key rates are shown in [182]. A two-user interference channel with a noiseless, shared feedback channel from the receivers and corresponding bounds on the secret-key capacity region are studied in [183], while the multiple-access channel was examined in [184].…”
Section: Wireless Secret Key Agreementmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We remark that the case of active adversaries (i.e. unauthenticated channels) has been extensively studied in [71,73,93,94,121,122]. However, even in this scenario it is generally assumed that Eve is passive for the initial noisy broadcast, which is again unrealistic.…”
Section: I(x; R) < I(z; R) and I(y ; R) < I(z; R)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our focus, separate from previous work on active attacks [15,14], is strictly on passive attacks against physical-layer key extraction in which the adversary observes an execution of the key extraction protocol between two parties without interfering. Mathur et al briefly considered a passive adversary (say, Eve) who attempts to derive the same key as Alice and Bob using only her own channel measurements.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%