Kernel Vulnerability Analysis: A Survey

Lu, Shuaibing; Lin, Zhechao; Zhang, Ming

doi:10.1109/dsc.2019.00089

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Cited by 3 publications

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“…For this paper, an attacker may attack via the network through DOS attacks, or in the case of CFI attacks, the attacker may change the program's memory by exploiting some vulnerability [39]. In this paper, a CFI attack refers to an attack on a native binary.…”

Section: Threat Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nanovised Control Flow Attestation

2022

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This paper presents an improvement of control flow attestation (C-FLAT) for Linux. C-FLAT is a control attestation system for embedded devices. It was implemented as a software executing in ARM’s TrustZone on bare-metal devices. We extend the design and implementation of C-FLAT through the use of a type 2 Nanovisor in the Linux operating system. We call our improved system “C-FLAT Linux”. Compared to the original C-FLAT, C-FLAT Linux reduces processing overheads and is able to detect the SlowLoris attack. We describe the architecture of C-FLAT Linux and provide extensive measurements of its performance in benchmarks and real-world scenarios. In addition, we demonstrate the detection of the SlowLoris attack on the Apache web server.

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Section: Threat Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%