Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa

Abstract

Kenya's invasion of southern Somalia, which began in October 2011, has turned into an occupation of attritionwhile "blowback" from the invasion has consolidated in a series of deadly Al-Shabaab attacks within Kenya. This article reviews the background to the invasion, Operation Linda Nchi, and the prosecution of the war by Kenya's Defence Forces up to the capture of the city of Kismayo and the contest to control its lucrative port. The second section discusses Al-Shabaab's response, showing how the movement has reinvented itself to take the struggle into Kenya. We conclude that while the military defeat of Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia seems inevitable, such a victory may become irrelevant to Kenya's ability to make a political settlement with its Somali and wider Muslim communities at home. ON 16 OCTOBER 2011, KENYA'S armed forces invaded southern Somalia in the midst of a severe local famine and a regional drought. Their purpose was to capture the port city of Kismayo and to crush the Al-Shabaab Islamist militia. 1 The first aim was accomplished after more than a year of slow progress and sometimes hard fighting, but with the second aim seemingly as remote as ever after a third year of war, the capture of Kismayo looks increasingly like a hollow victory. Al-Shabaab has reacted with gun, bomb, and grenade attacks against targets in Nairobi, Garissa, and other Kenya towns, most notorious among them the assault upon Nairobi's

Somali Refugee Solutions in Kenya: Challenges of Repatriation and Prospects of Local Integration.

“…Kenya's increased push for repatriation intensified after the Linda Nchi military campaign launched mid-October 2011 and led by Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in hot pursuit of Al Shabaab militia inside Somalia. This attracted retaliatory attacks by Al Shabaab inside Kenyan soils as militia sought to erode Kenya's military victory in southern Somalia (Anderson & Mcknight, 2014). During these retaliatory attack in Kenya by Al Shabaab, GoK has insisted that the planning and execution of some of these attacks are done at the Dadaab refugee camps by armed refugees or people disguising themselves as refugees.…”

“…Although there is no concrete evidence as none of Somali refugee has been successfully prosecuted for these attacks, the GoK insists that it wants to close these camps because they are a "security challenge" and are an "existential threat" on Kenya. Of the many terrorists attacks by the Somali-based Al Shabaab militia, the West Gate Mall attack of 2013 (Anderson & Mcknight, 2014) and Garissa University attack 8 of 2015 are among the worst of these attacks where both claimed more than 200 lives. Calls for repatriation of Somali refugees often intensify following such attacks with GoK officials leading the charge of blaming Somali refugees.…”

Intervenção, conflitos étnicos e fronteiras porosas: um panorama das relações Quênia-Somália no pós-2011

“…Houve, ademais, preocupações iniciais do governo etíope em função de que a ação queniana poderia empoderar grupos locais secessionistas na região de Ogaden 12 . Os dois governos, no entanto, chegaram logo num acordo que passou a coordenar futuras ações militares conjuntas entre as suas respectivas forças armadas (ANDERSON; MCKNIGHT, 2014).…”

“…Não tardou, portanto, para que a KDF passasse a integrar a AMISOM, ao lado de outras tropas africanas e do exército nacional somali, sob o mando da União Africana e com apoio declarado tanto dos EUA 13 quanto da União Europeia 14 . Assim sendo, as forças quenianas foram formalmente integradas à Missão da União Africana na Somália (AMISOM) em maio de 2012, passando a ser formalmente incorporadas na agenda multilateral de contenção do Al-Shabaab e de suporte ao frágil governo central da Somália (ANDERSON; MCKNIGHT, 2014).…”

“…A operação, discursivamente baseada na manutenção da segurança e da paz em território queniano, era uma resposta direta ao crescente número de atentados e de células afiliadas ao Al-Shabaab no país. A primeira ação da operação incluíra um cerceamento seguido de prisão de 650 quenianos de etnia somali no bairro Eastleigh -comumente chamado de pequena Mogadíscio em função da alta incidência de somalis étnicos -em Nairóbi (ANDERSON; MCKNIGHT, 2014). Essa missão dera início a uma série de atentados que passaram a assediar, muitas vezes de forma arbitrária, grande parte da população islâmica e de etnia somali dentro do território queniano.…”