Keeping Your Head Down: Public Profiles and Promotion Under Autocracy

Abstract

During recent party congresses in China and Vietnam, two highly anticipated candidates for promotion were sidelined. In China, Bo Xilai was arrested for corruption and stripped of his party membership. In Vietnam, Nguyen Ba Thanh remained a provincial leader with little opportunity for promotion to the Politburo. Existing arguments about promotions under authoritarian rule are unable to explain these outcomes. In particular, both candidates were competent and well connected. This cuts contrary to the expectations of both performance-based promotion and factional promotion theories. We argue that these candidates were sidelined due to a previously undertheorized factor in promotion contests-their ability to mobilize personal followings. Amidst a literature that has focused almost exclusively on intra-elite conflict, we argue that elite-mass linkages are critical. In particular, the public profile of top leaders is important for regime legitimacy and mobilization. However, when individuals become exceptionally well known they become threats to the single-party system. We test this argument on promotions in China's 18th Party Congress in 2012 and Vietnam's 11th Party Congress in 2011, using original data on Internet search queries and media coverage among contenders for promotion. Our approach offers new insights into the strategies authoritarian politicians use to stay afloat as well as the mistakes that sink them when competing for power under one-party rule.The study of elite politics under single-party rule offers insights into the strengths and frailties of a system that is, by design, intended to be non-competitive. Yet, as the contributions to this special issue demonstrate, the interplay between elites and their networks (factions) is anything but non-competitive. In the absence of elections, the contest of ambitions is most clearly visible in the realm of promotions, which, despite significant efforts at meritocratic institutionalization, remains intensely sensitive to internal contests between regime elites. In the case of China, studies of promotion reveal that factional affiliations play an important role in the party's internal balance of power, which, were it not for party norms and rituals, could spill over into visible internal splits.This article contributes by bringing attention to an omission in the existing discussion of elite authoritarian politics. Most work on elite promotions, including the other contributions to this special issue, sets aside societal connections to focus exclusively on intraelite conflicts, which given the lack of direct electoral connection, makes some sense. At the same time, we contend that what makes promotion so salient is the fact that internal

Testing the “China Model” of Meritocratic Promotions: Do Democracies Reward Less Competent Ministers Than Autocracies?

“…We use this distinction to make a series of predictions regarding how ministers are evaluated in democracies and autocracies. Building on Gueorguiev and Schuler (2016) and consistent with the proponents of autocratic meritocracy, we argue that autocrats will value technical competence. However, consistent with theoretical and empirical research on promotions, autocrats will also be less likely to promote based on political competence (i.e., the ability to attract attention).…”

“…Indeed, while this support base may not translate into aggregate popularity, although it often does, the intensity and concentration of the support afford them greater independence from the party collective. As we discuss in the next section, democratic leaders are more likely to indulge such ministers because of their potential to deliver votes (Tavits, 2009), whereas such ministers may be punished in autocracies due to their ability to upset internal power-sharing dynamics (Gueorguiev & Schuler, 2016).…”

“…Both democracies and autocracies should have a desire to promote officials with technical skills to ensure that policies are well devised and implemented. With regard to political skills, democracies need political skills among ministers to build coalitions and electoral support (Geddes, 1994), but even autocrats who may be less concerned with elections and coalitions should also desire political competence to ensure that the regime is minimally popular and able to win support for its policies (Crabtree et al, 2018; Dimitrov, 2009; Gueorguiev & Schuler, 2016; Reuter & Robertson, 2012). Therefore, both autocracies and democracies should prefer promoting technically and politically competent officials.…”

“…What about political competence in autocracies? Although autocracies face fewer electoral pressures, they will still prefer to attract public attention because this will reduce the cost of remaining in power (Dimitrov, 2009; Gueorguiev & Schuler, 2016). At the same time, in contrast to democracies, ministers displaying the ability to attract attention at high levels of government could pose a threat to authoritarian leaders (Gueorguiev & Schuler, 2016).…”

Dictator’s Shadow

“…(23) This approach departs from positive selection in two important ways. First, it biases against the rise of popular candidates, a principle that is a mainstay of collective leadership (Gueorguiev and Schuler 2016). Second, negative voting allows voters to knock off multiple names at once, which makes it difficult for voters to coordinate on a preferred candidate.…”