In her editor's introduction to a recent special issue of Modernism/modernity, "Mediamorphosis: Print Culture and Transatlantic/Transnational Public Sphere(s)," Ann Ardis writes that the issue works to "unsettle a very familiar and interrelated set of 'great divides' that have governed the study of this period." 1 Ardis's list of "great divides," however, leaves one unmentioned: that is, the divide that has traditionally existed between white and black American moderns, or Euro-American authors, especially those belonging to the "Lost Generation," such as Ernest Hemingway, Gertrude Stein, and F. Scott Fitzgerald, and the authors of the Harlem Renaissance. Although the new modernist studies has increasingly made race an important consideration of modern discourse, it has not adequately addressed the deeper significance of this divide. 2 In this context, rather than simply pursuing the study of chronologically relevant African American texts, it is important to ask what can the critical encounter with race, as a disembodied concept or idea, bring to an understanding of the modern itself? Certainly, although race has been and is now even more a central concern for modernists, the idea of race itself in modern discourse has largely escaped the meticulous investigation it has received in philosophy for a long time. From this alternative vantage point, race and modernity may be seen to possess what might be termed a more than symbiotic relationship, in which the significance of one may be thought almost to be bred from the other. If, as the preeminent scholar of critical modernism / modernity volume twenty five, number one, pp 45-72. © 2018 johns hopkins university press [44.224.250.200] Project MUSE (2024-05-26 03:17 GMT)MODERNISM / modernity 46 race theory David Theo Goldberg has articulated, this relationship may be described more fundamentally in terms of the idea that modernity serves both to camouflage and to provide the ground for radical, racially determined exclusions, it is, then, only within its purview that such exclusions may be discovered and laid bare to further examination for the whole of modern discourse. Goldberg writes:In the case of discriminatory exclusions, it can be strongly concluded that what the moral order fails explicitly to exclude it implicitly authorizes. . . . But in ignoring the social fabric and concrete identities in virtue of which moral judgment and reason are individually effective . . . moral modernity fails to recognize the series of exclusions upon which the state of modernity is constituted. . . . So, though the formal principles of moral modernity condemn and discourage some racist expressions, they fail, and fail necessarily, to condemn and discourage such expressions exhaustively. 3