Kant, Wolff, and the Method of Philosophy

Gava, Gabriele

doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829294.003.0009

Cited by 11 publications

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“…8 The question regarding Kant's philosophical method cannot of course be reduced to the problem of transcendental arguments. On some other aspects of Kant's philosophical method, see Gava (2015), Gava (2018a), and Gava (2018b). 9 References to Kant's works will be given according to the standard edition (Kant, 1900-), indicating volume and page number.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Kant, the Third Antinomy and Transcendental Arguments

Gava

2018

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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In this paper, I consider whether a reading of Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy can offer material for devising a new model of transcendental argument. The problem that this form of argument is meant to address is an antinomy between two apparently contradictory claims, q and ¬q, where we seem equally justified in holding both. The model has the following form: p; q is a necessary condition of p; the only justification we have for q is that it is a necessary condition of p; p is justified only in domain X (where X is a domain of objects of cognition); therefore, q is justified only in domain X. Because the argument shows that our justification for q is valid only in X, it also establishes that there is conceptual space to hold ¬q outside of X.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The question regarding Kant's philosophical method cannot of course be reduced to the problem of transcendental arguments. On some other aspects of Kant's philosophical method, see Gava (), Gava (), and Gava ().…”

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confidence: 99%

Kant, the Third Antinomy and Transcendental Arguments

Gava

2018

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…It might be important to point out that Kant does not object to the dogmatic procedure (an a priori proof from well-established principles) which he sees Wolff's method as exemplifying, but rather to dogmatism, which is the employment of the dogmatic procedure without the prior critique of the capacities of this procedure. For more detail see Gava (2018). 12 "… proponuntur dogmata, seu veritates universales."…”

Section: On Dogmasmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…the one requiring theories to be falsifi able, is necessary for a theory to count as scientifi c. On the other hand, one may consider referring to scientifi c theories as 'dogmas' to be not merely strange, but dangerous, since it could be perceived as playing into the hands of those who might try 26 This might remind us of Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, however, we need to be careful not to confl ate the synthetic and analytic method, which for Wolff is related to the order of presenting scientifi c dogmas, with the analytic and synthetic judgment that are Kant's invention. For more detail see Gava (2018). For Kant's understanding and critique of Wolff's scientifi c dogmata as applied to physics, see Frketich (2019).…”

Section: On Dogmasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grounding Religious Toleration: Kant and Wolff on Dogmatic Conflict

Jakušić

2020

Diametros

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This article examines Paul Guyer’s claim that we should attempt to ground the principle of religious freedom on the basis of Kant’s arguments for religious liberty. I problematise Guyer’s suggestion by investigating a hypothetical ‘dogmatic conflict’ between a scientifically and a religiously grounded belief. I further suggest that considering Christian Wolff’s philosophy might provide us with an approach which shares the benefits that Guyer identifies in Kant, while at the same time avoiding the issues Kant might run into that result from the occurrence of the dogmatic conflict. I start by providing a background to Wolff’s philosophy and explaining the notion of the dogmatic conflict. Then I present a potential contemporary case of the dogmatic conflict and try to see how it would be dealt with based on Guyer’s proposal. Finally, I consider what a Wolffian solution would look like, arguing that Guyer’s project might benefit from considering Wolff.

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“…Among other publications arising from the latter project see in particular:Gava (2018Gava ( , 2019a.…”

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Introduction: Kant’s philosophical method and contemporary perspectives in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and ethics

Gava

2021

Synthese

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If one considers the history of analytic philosophy, one can easily appreciate why Kant's views in epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of mind have generally been regarded with suspicion. Take Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism, his account of space and time as forms of intuitions, or his views on causality. These are just a few examples of Kant's ideas that have enjoyed very little success among analytic philosophers. 1 Beginning in the 1960s, however, a renewed interest in Kant's works in theoretical philosophy emerged among analytically-minded philosophers. Thanks in large part to Peter Strawson's use of transcendental arguments as tools against scepticism (1959) and his interpretation of the first Critique (1966), it appeared that Kant's approach could be made to work if one focused not so much on his substantive views in epistemology, metaphysics or the philosophy of mind, but rather on the strategy of argument he used. Indeed, as a result of this renewed interest in Kant, transcendental arguments were put at the centre of a dynamic debate during the second half of the last century (for a reconstruction of the debate see Gava 2017a,b; Pereboom 2019; Stern 2019).Within this debate, however, transcendental arguments were subject to serious criticism, which questioned their ability to refute radical scepticism (for famous criticisms, see Stroud 1968;Brueckner 1983Brueckner , 1984. In answering these worries, some scholars have argued that transcendental arguments can be successful if they are re-conceived along more 'modest' lines. They suggested, for example, that transcendental arguments can establish not that the world must be a certain way, but

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Kant, Wolff, and the Method of Philosophy

Cited by 11 publications

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Kant, the Third Antinomy and Transcendental Arguments

Kant, the Third Antinomy and Transcendental Arguments

Grounding Religious Toleration: Kant and Wolff on Dogmatic Conflict

Introduction: Kant’s philosophical method and contemporary perspectives in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and ethics

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