Kant's leading thread in the Analytic of the Beautiful

Longuenesse, Béatrice

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487279.011

Cited by 4 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 28 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…For example, consider Budd ; Ginsborg , , , ; Guyer ; Henrich ; Hughes ; Kern ; Kukla ; Longuenesse , , , and : 164; Makkreel ; Rush ; Seel ; and Zuckert . I do not wish to suggest that all of these authors exclusively focus on exploring the connection between aesthetic judgment and cognition (consider, for example, Hughes , ch.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…ch. 9) and Longuenesse search for connections to Kant's practical philosophy in the logical structure of Kant's aesthetic judgment. However, they still conceive reflection in aesthetic judgment primarily as the logical act of the understanding and not imagination and, therefore, miss the genuine connection aesthetic judgment provides to the supersensible.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is the view that Paul Guyer calls ‘precognitive’ (see Guyer : 81) and Andrea Kern calls ‘material’ (see Kern : 51). Some proponents of this view, and the list, again, is not intended to be exhaustive, are Crawford ; Ginsborg , , , and ; Henrich ; Longuenesse , , , ; Meerbote . My paper will engage in more detail the more recent defenses of this view by Ginsborg and Longuenesse.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The Free Harmony of the Faculties and the Primacy of Imagination in Kant's Aesthetic Judgment

Ostaric

2017

European J of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This essay argues that, contrary to the prevailing view according to which reflection in Kant's aesthetic judgment is interpreted as ‘the logical actus of the understanding’, we should pay closer attention to Kant's own formulation of aesthetic reflection as ‘an action of the power of imagination’. Put differently, I contend in this essay that the rule that governs and orders the manifold in aesthetic judgment is imagination's own achievement, the achievement of the productive synthesis of the ‘fictive power’ (Dichtungsvermögen), entirely independent of the understanding. While this view does not entail that the faculty of the understanding is not necessary in aesthetic reflection, a stronger emphasis on the role of imagination in aesthetic reflection allows us to realize that its schematizing and interpretive activity, while consistent with, goes well beyond the discursive demands of the understanding insofar as it intimates the supersensible ground of freedom that manifests itself as ‘the feeling of life’. Therefore, I show in this essay that the imagination's unique interpretive power has a special role in completing Kant's critical system by facilitating the connection of the sensible to the supersensible, which further helps us appreciate imagination's practical as opposed to merely cognitive significance.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Free Harmony of the Faculties and the Primacy of Imagination in Kant's Aesthetic Judgment

Ostaric

2017

European J of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…If so, then it should be no surprise that Kant and Aristotle have similar views on the pleasantness of moral activity. On the connection between pleasure and life in Kant, with emphasis on aesthetics, see Zuckert (2007) and Longuenesse (2005). One potentially worrisome consequence of assimilating the Kantian account to the Aristotelian account is that it seems to imply that the proper functioning of our theoretical faculties should be as pleasant -indeed, in some cases, as intrinsically pleasant -as the proper functioning of our practical faculties.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

More than a feeling

Elizondo

2014

Can. J. of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing on underappreciated elements of Kant's moral psychology, I sketch an alternative form of rationalism, according to which moral activity is by nature pleasant because at least some pleasures are by nature rational.

show abstract

“…55 55 Longuenesse (2006, 7). My understanding of the Analytic of the Beautiful has been greatly enhanced by this paper. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%