Kant’s Idea of Human Dignity: Between Tradition and Originality

Abstract

Abstract:This paper focuses on the relationship between Kant and the traditional view of dignity. I argue that some amendments to Sensen’s description of the traditional paradigm enable us to see more clearly both where Kant adheres to the latter and where his view is original. First, a consideration of Pufendorf’s use of dignity suggests (1) that, contrary to Sensen’s reconstruction, the traditional paradigm does not entail a connection between dignity and duties to oneself, and (2) that Pufendorf’s understanding of dignity as a kind of esteem, as opposed to price, provides a crucial mediation between the traditional view and Kant’s view. Finally, I argue that the traditional understanding of dignity also includes a subordinate justificatory element that helps to explain Kant’s use of dignity in the

Kant and the Second Person

“…However, this reading of the second-personal account seems to be widely shared in Kantian practical philosophy. Among Kantians, it is commonly assumed that, by definition, only duties to others are second-personal (see, for example, Bacin 2015: 105; Ebels-Duggan 2009: 9n36; Flikschuh 2017: 78n29; Ripstein 2009: 109n1). Some authors even explicitly tie the second-personal account to the sphere of juridical duties, as opposed to morality as whole (see, for example, Flikschuh 2017: 78n29; Pauer-Studer 2010: 300–2; Ripstein 2009: 109n1).…”

Recovery of Human Diginity; Kantian Consideration

“…The word dignity is the English derivative of the Latin word "dignete", these two different words from different roots, connotes one and the same thing, that is, the quality of being esteemed, worthy or honored (Bacin 2015). It could also be used to refer to high rank, office or position or a legal title of nobility (Merriam lexicon).…”