Kant’s Definition of Science in the Architectonic of Pure Reason and the Essential Ends of Reason

Abstract

The paper analyses the definition of science as an architectonic unity, which Kant gives in the Architectonic of Pure Reason. I will show how this definition is problematic, insofar as it is affected by the various ways in which the relationship of reason to ends is discussed in this chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant sometimes claims that architectonic unity is only obtainable thanks to an actual reference to the essential practical ends of human reason, but he also identifies disciplines that do not make this reference as scientific. In order to find a solution to this apparent contradiction, I will first present Kant's distinction between a scholastic and a cosmic concept of philosophy. This distinction expresses Kant's foreshadowing of his later insistence on the priority of practical philosophy within a true system of philosophy. Then, I will present a related distinction between technical and architectonic unity and show how Kant seems to use two different conceptions of science, one simply attributing systematic unity to science, the other claiming that science should consider the essential practical ends of human beings. I will propose a solution to this problem by arguing that, if we give a closer look to Kant's claims, the unity of scientific disciplines can be considered architectonic without taking into consideration the essential practical ends of human reason. In fact, it is only philosophy, as a particular discipline which aims to become a science, that cannot develop into a systematic whole without considering those essential practical ends. It is thus only in philosophy that we cannot reach scientificity without considering these ends.

The Universe of Science. The Architectonic Ideas of Science, Sciences and their Parts in Kant

“…Справедливости ради надо заметить, что многие авторы обращаются к кантовскому понятию идей наук, но при этом касаются скорее смежных тем, не занимаясь углубленным исследованием и объяснением конкретной функциональности чистого разума в отношении подобных идей 3 . Поднимаемые современными исследователями вопросы включают в себя следующую проблематику: систематичность и взаимосвязь наук , связь между отраслями науки и (практическими) целями разума (Sturm, 2020;Gava, 2014), исторические корни системы понятий кантовской философии (см. : Switzer, 2014;Sturm, 2009, p. 131-146) и т. д. Я же хочу пойти иным путем и сосредоточиться именно на архитектонической действенности, способности и процедуре действия разума (в узком смысле) 4 .…”

“…Для изучения общего характера философии науки Канта см., например: (Sturm, 2009;Kant and the Sciences, 2001;Friedman, 1992;Kitcher, 1983). Последние публикации по теме архитектоники Канта: (Gava, 2014;Switzer, 2014;, по концепции регулятивных идей Канта и их функций, связанных с наукой, см. : , по теме трансцендентальных идей в целом: Pissis, 2012;Klimmek, 2005).…”

“…McRae, 1957), the relation between the sciences and the (practical) ends of reason (cf. Sturm, 2020;Gava, 2014), the historical roots of the Kantian conceptual framework (cf. Switzer, 2014;Sturm, 2009, pp.…”

“…For analyses which include general inquiries into the nature of the Kantian philosophy of science see e. g. Sturm (2009), Watkins (2001), Friedman (1992) and Kitcher (1983). For recent publications on Kant's Architectonics see Gava (2014), Switzer (2014) and . For Kant's concept of regulative ideas and their science-related functions see , for transcendental ideas in general , , Pissis (2012) and Klimmek (2005).…”

Proposal for a Degree of Scientificity in Cosmology

“…That is, before Karl Popper and his famous and controversial concept of falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation between science and metaphysical speculation, 5 Immanuel Kant emphasized that empirical data is a necessary condition in order to promote thoughts to cognition (or scientific knowledge). Thus, according to scholars (Gava, 2014;Janiak, 2004;van den Berg, 2011;Watkins and Stan, 2014;Werkmeister, 1977), Kant may be considered as a philosopher of science as well, and, for his philosophy of science, cognition is constructed from concepts and empirical data. As I said, the big bang, as the initial singularity, does not provide data.…”