Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

Burnham, Douglas

doi:10.1515/9780748631476

Cited by 5 publications

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“…It does not appear to be a straightforward analytic condition in the way that, for example, being unmarried is an analytic condition for being a bachelor. While, being a bachelor logically entails being unmarried, the relation between the a priori intuition of space and the intuition of a globe is not one of logical entailment (Burnham, Young 2007). However, it also does not appear to be a straightforward case of the synthetic a posteriori.…”

Section: The Subject As a Transcendental Condition Of Possibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Repenser l’argument de la concevabilité pour le dualisme dans la philosophie de l’esprit

Maung

2023

Synth. philos. (Online)

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U filozofskoj literaturi o svijesti i problemu odnosa uma i tijela, argument pojmljivosti protiv fizikalizma obično se uzima kao podrška obliku dualizma između fizikalnosti i fenomenalnosti. Obično se rasprava usredotočuje na kvalitativni karakter iskustva, što je fenomenalni osjećaj određenog iskustva. Nasuprot tome, subjektivni karakter iskustva – tj. njegova individuacija danom subjektu u prvom licu – nastoji se ostaviti po strani. Cilj je ovog rada predstaviti novu i snažniju verziju argumenta pojmljivosti za dualizam koji se poziva na subjektivni karakter iskustva. Oslanjajući se na uvide filozofa u fenomenološkoj tradiciji, konceptualiziram subjektivni karakter iskustva u prvom licu kao transcendentalni uvjet mogućnosti fenomenalnosti koji se ne može svesti na činjenice trećeg lica o fizičkom svijetu. S obzirom na to, problem uma i tijela koji se odnosi na svijest ne tiče se samo nemogućnosti skupa fizičkih činjenica o stanju mozga da uhvati kvalitativni karakter iskustva nego i egzistencijalnog pitanja o tome zašto je to stanje mozga uopće popraćeno subjektivnošću prvog lica. To nam omogućuje da ponovno zamislimo argument pojmljivosti na način koji predstavlja jaču argumentaciju za dualizam od tradicionalne verzije argumenta.

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Section: The Subject As a Transcendental Condition Of Possibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Repenser l’argument de la concevabilité pour le dualisme dans la philosophie de l’esprit

Maung

2023

Synth. philos. (Online)

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“…Questions such as these gave rise to the geometric module (Cheng and Newcombe, 2005) and cognitive map theory (Tolman, 1948), notions originating from the ideology that our brains are preconfigured, or at least semi-preconfigured, with navigational hardware (Ainge and Langston, 2012). The idea of an a priori representation of space dates back to Kant (1922), Burnham (2008), andJaniak (2009), who opposed Hume (1738) empirical view. Kant proposed that space is not empirically testable, and surmised that since we cannot perceive the absence of space we must, therefore, have innate knowledge of space (Burnham, 2008).…”

Section: Abstract Locusmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The idea of an a priori representation of space dates back to Kant (1922), Burnham (2008), andJaniak (2009), who opposed Hume (1738) empirical view. Kant proposed that space is not empirically testable, and surmised that since we cannot perceive the absence of space we must, therefore, have innate knowledge of space (Burnham, 2008). Whether or not we possess the faculties to process our surroundings innately as the nativist Kantian perspective would suggest, or whether it is a result of acquired experience as empiricist Jean (1967) would argue, we do seem to be able to form coherent neural representations of the space we traverse.…”

Section: Abstract Locusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contextual memory engrams, and the neuromodulatory influence of the locus coeruleus

Grella,

Donaldson

2024

Front. Mol. Neurosci.

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Here, we review the basis of contextual memory at a conceptual and cellular level. We begin with an overview of the philosophical foundations of traversing space, followed by theories covering the material bases of contextual representations in the hippocampus (engrams), exploring functional characteristics of the cells and subfields within. Next, we explore various methodological approaches for investigating contextual memory engrams, emphasizing plasticity mechanisms. This leads us to discuss the role of neuromodulatory inputs in governing these dynamic changes. We then outline a recent hypothesis involving noradrenergic and dopaminergic projections from the locus coeruleus (LC) to different subregions of the hippocampus, in sculpting contextual representations, giving a brief description of the neuroanatomical and physiological properties of the LC. Finally, we examine how activity in the LC influences contextual memory processes through synaptic plasticity mechanisms to alter hippocampal engrams. Overall, we find that phasic activation of the LC plays an important role in promoting new learning and altering mnemonic processes at the behavioral and cellular level through the neuromodulatory influence of NE/DA in the hippocampus. These findings may provide insight into mechanisms of hippocampal remapping and memory updating, memory processes that are potentially dysregulated in certain psychiatric and neurodegenerative disorders.

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“…The categories are just these functions of judgement considered as determining pure intuition.' 67 In the second part of the Deduction, Kant expands on these ideas, but specifically for human knowledge via intuition. For instance, the previous distinction between the UoA and 'subjective unity' can now be mapped on to the distinction in §22 between thinking (denken) and cognition (erkennen).…”

Section: Kant's Unity Of Apperception As 'Thought' But Not 'Known'mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Transcendental Unity of Apperception and Christian Apophaticism

Moore

2022

Irish Theological Quarterly

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This study provides an original theological interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) Transcendental Unity of Apperception in light of Nicholas of Cusa’s (1401–1464) apophaticism. The study will show that Kant’s Transcendental Unity contains a thoroughly anti-theological premise. This is namely that our own ‘I think’ grounds the distinction between the transcendent (that which we think but don’t know) and immanent (that which we know). This premise is then contrasted with Cusa’s conception whereby the distinction is grounded in the transcendent itself. Whilst for Kant our thought itself produces the distinction between ‘thinking’ (Denken) and ‘knowing’ (Erkennen), for Cusa the distinction between ‘knowing that’ (quia est), and ‘knowing what’ (quid est) is produced by God himself.

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Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Repenser l’argument de la concevabilité pour le dualisme dans la philosophie de l’esprit

Repenser l’argument de la concevabilité pour le dualisme dans la philosophie de l’esprit

Contextual memory engrams, and the neuromodulatory influence of the locus coeruleus

The Transcendental Unity of Apperception and Christian Apophaticism

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