Kant’s Account of Cognition

Watkins, Eric; Willaschek, Marcus

doi:10.1353/hph.2017.0003

Cited by 128 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 29 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…below. For a more detailed argument for requiring that the givenness condition be understood as involving existence (for both empirical and mathematical objects), see Willaschek (2017a and2017b). Note also, however, that the main point of this paper obtains regardless of whether one accepts our specific interpretation of the givenness condition.…”

Section: Consequences For Understanding Thementioning

confidence: 84%

Kant on cognition and knowledge

Willaschek

Watkins

2017

Synthese

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Consequences For Understanding Thementioning

confidence: 84%

Kant on cognition and knowledge

Willaschek

Watkins

2017

Synthese

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…The notion of "cognition" (Erkenntnis) has itself come under significant scrutiny of late. See Schafer (in press-a; in press-b), Willaschek and Watkins (2017), Watkins and Willaschek (2017) for representative discussion.…”

Section: The Argument From Self-consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Detailing the complex relationship between cognition and knowledge requires more space than I can devote to it here. For some relevant discussion see Chignell (2014), Watkins and Willaschek (2017). maintains that "in the consciousness of myself in mere thinking I am the being itself" (B429) that is thinking, which is to say that in pure apperception I am nonempirically aware of my existence, and of the acts of thinking that I, as existing, bring about.…”

Section: The Argument From Self-consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect

McLear¹

2020

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Kant holds that the applicability of the moral 'ought' depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify "cognitive control" in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing. Considered merely as intelligence, a human being is an imputable subject in which, of course, at the same time is united a natural being that subjects it to natural laws; [a being] nevertheless, whose determination depends upon intelligence, insofar as the possibility to act is granted him; therefore it is only to be derived how far a human being can be called cause of his actions and these can be imputed to him; and [it is] just as certain that, if he were led merely by natural laws, it would be impossible to impute to him any action, since the ground of action then would never lie in his control, but rather would be determined in the previous time.

show abstract

“… McLear (2017: p. 89) Allais ( , 2017,Hanna (2001Hanna ( , 2005,. McLear (2016) andWatkins and Willaschek (2017) defend similar views. 17Stephenson (2015Stephenson ( , 2017 andGrüne (2017).…”

mentioning

confidence: 91%

A representationalist reading of Kantian intuitions

Shahmoradi

2019

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

There are passages in Kant's writings according to which empirical intuitions have to be (a) singular, (b) object-dependent, and (c) immediate. It has also been argued that empirical intuitions (d) are not truth-apt, and (e) need to provide the subject with a proof of the possibility of the cognized object. Having relied on one or another of the a-e constraints, the naïve realist readers of Kant have argued that it is not possible for empirical intuitions to be representations. Instead they have argued for a relationalist reading of empirical intuitions in terms of an acquaintance relation between the subject and the intuited object. For the sake of argument, I will grant the naïve realist reader of Kant that empirical intuitions should satisfy all the (a)-(e) constraints. Nevertheless, by incorporating these constraints, one by one, into a representationalist theory of empirical intuitions, I will show that not only doesn't a naïve realist reading of empirical intuitions follow, but also that the naïve realist has hastily overlooked a range of perfectly representationalist readings of intuitions available to Kant and his representationalist allies. On the positive side, I will argue that there is an extra constraint on intuitions-i.e., that givenness does not require presence to consciousness-that directly goes against any naïve realist account of intuitions.

show abstract

Kant’s Account of Cognition

Cited by 128 publications

References 29 publications

Kant on cognition and knowledge

Kant on cognition and knowledge

On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect

A representationalist reading of Kantian intuitions

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About