Kant's A Priori Intuition of Space Independent of Postulates

Abstract

Defences of Kant's foundations of geometry fall short if they are unable to equally ground Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries. Thus, Kant's account must be separated from geometrical postulates. I argue that characterizing space as the form of outer intuition must be independent of postulates. Geometrical postulates are then expressions of particular spatializing activities made possible by the a priori intuition of space. While Amit Hagar contends that this is to speak of noumena, I argue that a Kantian account of space as the form of outer attention-directing remains seated in the subject.The Euclidean postulates are intuitively plausible. That intuitive plausibility, however, concerns whether or not they admit of Kant's central edgar j. valdez 136 | KANTIAN REVIEW VOLUME 17 -1