Kant on Moral Feeling and Respect

Abstract

Although in his earlier ethical writings Kant explains the concept of moral feeling, inherited from the British sentimentalists, as a peculiar feeling of respect for the moral law that functions as an incentive for moral actions, the Doctrine of Virtue seems to add complexity to the issue. There, Kant discusses two similar aesthetic predispositions, moral feeling and respect, whose relationship to the feeling of respect is far from clear. This article offers a much needed elucidation of the relationship between these three concepts. In the first part, I show that Kant, in the writings before the Doctrine of Virtue, transforms the British sentimentalists’ construal of moral feeling into that of the feeling of respect as the sole moral incentive. In the second part, I argue that, although in the Doctrine of Virtue Kant distinguishes, for a specific reason, between the aesthetic predisposition of moral feeling and that of respect, they are both ultimately identical to the feeling of respect. The conclusion is that nothing of substance changes between Kant’s earlier thinking and his views in the Doctrine of Virtue; for Kant there is just one feeling that properly deserves the name of moral feeling, the feeling of respect.

Kant’s Principia Diiudicationis and Executionis

“…For discussions of moral feeling and respect, see Guyer (2016: 250f. ), Kolomý (2023), andStratton-Lake (2001: 30-4). 18 Note Kant's repetition of this line of thinking in his lectures on anthropology from winter semester 1775-76: 'if the child lies, then it must be shamed and condemned as if no human being wanted anything to do with him : : : he must be regarded as if he is shunned, as if he were pelted with excrement' (L-Anth/ Fried, 25: 727).…”

Shaming behavior in online communities: exploring a new configuration of digital conversations

“…To facilitate a practical guideline to ethically optimize online discussions and limit hate speech in virtual communities, we present a conceptual model, “The Triple-Responsibility Model in Online Communities.” This model is based on Kant’s categorical imperative: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, 1993 [1785], p. 30). Founded on the principles of duty, universalizability and respect for individuals, Kant's categorical imperative is a beacon for ethics (Bagnoli, 2021; Allison, 2020) in information studies and the Internet (Ess and Thorseth, 2008) and provides a relevant and robust framework (Kolomý, 2023; Vereb, 2022) for addressing the unique ethical challenges presented by online communities. Our model provides a relevant and up-to-date application of the Kantian imperative to virtual communities and illustrates the unique roles of each of the actors in the virtual discourse process within online culture.…”