Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility

Abstract

This paper shows that Kant's account of cognition can be used to defend epistemic responsibility against the double threat of either being committed to implausible versions of doxastic voluntarism, or failing to account for a sufficiently robust connection between the will and belief. Whilst we have no direct control over our beliefs, we have two forms of indirect doxastic control that are sufficient to ground epistemic responsibility. It is because we have direct control over our capacity to judge as well as the epistemic principles that govern beliefacquisition that we have indirect control over the beliefs we thereby acquire.

On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect

“…It's worth emphasizing here that the central role accorded to attention does not require that Kant adopt any view stronger than an indirect doxastic voluntarism, according to which intellectual acts (e.g., judgment, assent) are not determined "at will" but rather affected by upstream willful acts (such as what we attend to and how). For discussion of Kant's endorsement of indirect voluntarism see Cohen (2013), Vance Buroker (2017). Thanks to Eric Watkins for urging clarity on this issue.…”