Kant on Civil Society and Welfare

Holtman, Sarah

doi:10.1017/9781108529747

Cited by 17 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…11 This is in direct contrast to the ways in which, as Kleingeld (2007) and Lu-Adler (2023) have pointed out, Kant's references to slavery explicitly take the perspective of the slave owner or slave trader. 12 See Davies (2020) and Holtman (2018) for the discussion of these debates. 13 See Pascoe (2018), ( 2022), (2023).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Response to Critics: Kant’s Theory of Labour

Pascoe

2024

Kantian rev.

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Elvira Basevich, Martin Sticker, and Helga Varden offered generative criticism of my monograph, Kant’s Theory of Labour. In this response, I explore how the resources they offer for thinking about gender, labour, and the state’s responsibility to ensure the material conditions of freedom can deepen both our attentiveness to patterns of systemic injustice in Kant’s political philosophy, and the resources Kant offers for addressing contemporary patterns of intersectional and material injustice.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Response to Critics: Kant’s Theory of Labour

Pascoe

2024

Kantian rev.

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“…Recently, however, more “generous” interpretations have also emerged. Even though, as we will see, these interpretations differ from each other in important respects, one feature they share in common is that they embed Kant's argument for state poverty relief within a broader juridical duty to eliminate certain types of dependence relations between members of society (e.g., Pogge 1988, 421–22n40; Kaufman 1999; Holtman 2004, 2018; Varden 2006, 270; Weinrib 2008; Ripstein 2009, 272–86; Allais 2015; Hasan 2018). They take poverty to imply a form of socioeconomic dependence that is inconsistent with the “attributes of a citizen, inseparable from his essence (as a citizen)”—namely, lawful freedom, civil equality, and civil independence (MM 6:314)—attributes in accordance with which alone the establishment of a state is possible in conformity with right (OCS 8:290).…”

Section: The Kantian Problem Of Povertymentioning

confidence: 99%

Kant on Social Justice: Poverty, Dependence, and Depersonification

Loriaux¹

2023

The Southern J of Philosophy

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The main purpose of this article is to bring into relief the difficulties faced by generous interpretations of the Kantian problem of poverty and to propose an alternative interpretation which (a) agrees with some generous interpretations that Kant's juridical treatment of poverty is to be understood by analogy with his juridical treatment of slavery, but which (b) departs from generous interpretations in general by arguing that this analogy is not to be understood in terms of "dependence" as such, but in terms of "depersonification." More specifically, it argues that what makes slavery and poverty unjust for Kant is not that they entail a human being finding herself (completely) dependent on the choice of another human being, but that they entail a human being being deprived of her juridical personality. The Kantian problem of poverty is ultimately a problem of juridical depersonification, and this problem of juridical depersonification does not arise in all (complete) dependence relations.

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“…The ideal of civic equality is a requirement of justice that should support the civil independence of all persons as active citizens (Holtman 2018). Our natural moral equality should entail a political right to control the institutional conditions of our existence (Love 2017: 587-90;Wood 2014: 84).…”

Section: Can the Ideal Of Civic Equality Undo Structural Domination?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Promise and Limit of Kant’s Theory of Justice: On Race, Gender and the Structural Domination of Labourers

Basevich

2022

Kantian rev.

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This article applies Charles W. Mills’ notion of the domination contract to develop a Kantian theory of justice. The concept of domination underlying the domination contract is best understood as structural domination, which unjustifiably authorizes institutions and labour practices to weaken vulnerable groups’ public standing as free, equal and independent citizens. Though Kant’s theory of justice captures why structural domination of any kind contradicts the requirements of justice, it neglects to condemn exploitive gender- and race-based labour relations. Because the ideal of civic equality must position all persons as co-legislators of the terms of political rule, the state must dismantle exploitive race- and gender-based labour relations for all persons to command political power as civic equals.

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Kant on Civil Society and Welfare

Cited by 17 publications

References 21 publications

Response to Critics: Kant’s Theory of Labour

Response to Critics: Kant’s Theory of Labour

Kant on Social Justice: Poverty, Dependence, and Depersonification

The Promise and Limit of Kant’s Theory of Justice: On Race, Gender and the Structural Domination of Labourers

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