Kant and the scientific study of consciousness

Abstract

We argue that Kant's views about consciousness, the mind-body problem and the status of psychology as a science all differ drastically from the way in which these topics are conjoined in present debates about the prominent idea of a science of consciousness. Kant never used the concept of consciousness in the now dominant sense of phenomenal qualia; his discussions of the mind-body problem center not on the reducibility of mental properties but of substances; and his views about the possibility of psychology as a science did not employ the requirement of a mechanistic explanation, but of a quantification of phenomena. This shows strikingly how deeply philosophical problems and conceptions can change even if they look similar on the surface.

Kant on Consciousness, Obscure Representations and Cognitive Availability

“…I do not claim that Kant is a higher-order theorist, because that is a highly complex issue. SeeSchlicht and Newen (2015),Bird (2016),Sturm and Wunderlich (2010). 4 I cite unpublished works and lecture notes when they are consistent with views expressed in Kant's published works.…”

“…Some researchers even doubt that a consistent theory of consciousness exists. See Brook (1997:46), Wunderlich (:133, 145), and Sturm and Wunderlich (:56).…”

Historical Epistemology or History of Epistemology? The Case of the Relation Between Perception and Judgment

“…One often reads, for example, that Descartes or Kant held this or that view on consciousness which is relevant for our present-day debates; but that may be quite misleading and distort Descartes' or Kant's statements (e.g. Kemmerling 1996;Sturm and Wunderlich 2010). What speaks against the No&No response, however, are two other points.…”

Consciousness as Inner Sensation: Crusius and Kant

“…18. See Wunderlich (2005), La Rocca (2008), Serck-Hanssen (2009), Sturm and Wunderlich (2010), and Schulting (2012b;.…”