Kant and the Claims of Knowledge

Abstract

This book offers a radically new account of the development and structure of the central arguments of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: the defense of the objective validity of such categories as substance, causation, and independent existence. Paul Guyer makes far more extensive use than any other commentator of historical materials from the years leading up to the publication of the Critique and surrounding its revision, and he shows that the work which has come down to us is the result of some striking and only partially resolved theoretical tensions. Kant had originally intended to demonstrate the validity of the categories by exploiting what he called 'analogies of appearance' between the structure of self-knowledge and our knowledge of objects. The idea of a separate 'transcendental deduction', independent from the analysis of the necessary conditions of empirical judgements, arose only shortly before publication of the Critique in 1781, and distorted much of Kant's original inspiration. Part of what led Kant to present this deduction separately was his invention of a new pattern of argument - very different from the 'transcendental arguments' attributed by recent interpreters to Kant - depending on initial claims to necessary truth.

Transformations of Transcendental Philosophy: Wolff, Kant, and Hegel

“…Commentators who have recently defended similar perspectives on the CPR include Fulda (1988) and (1999), Grondin (1989), Baum (1986) and (1993), Benoist (1996), andSchnepf (2007). Their readings differ substantially not only from the "analytical" interpretations of Kant put forward by Strawson (1966) and Guyer (1987), but also from Allison"s more nuanced, epistemological reading in Allison (2004: see note 31). "Unlike Locke"s," Guyer notes, Wolff"s philosophy "cannot even be compared with the constructive elements of Kant"s own" (Guyer 1987: 429, note 1).…”

“…Their readings differ substantially not only from the "analytical" interpretations of Kant put forward by Strawson (1966) and Guyer (1987), but also from Allison"s more nuanced, epistemological reading in Allison (2004: see note 31). "Unlike Locke"s," Guyer notes, Wolff"s philosophy "cannot even be compared with the constructive elements of Kant"s own" (Guyer 1987: 429, note 1). Whether this is indeed the case, however, depends on whether these elements are themselves framed in terms of a Lockean account of the way in which we achieve empirical knowledge or rather -as I propose -in terms of our capacity to produce and employ synthetic a priori principles.…”

Kant’ın İdealizmi Reddi

“…Ancak bu argüman da ortaya çıktığı ilk günden itibaren eleştirel felsefenin en çok tartışılan iddialarından bir oldu. Bu doğrultuda bir kısım yorumcular, Kant'ın transendental idealizm öğretisinin temel tezlerinden vazgeçtiğini dile getirirken (Guyer, 1987: 329 & Smith, 1918, bir kısım yorumcular da Kant'da herhangi bir fikir değişikliği olmadığını ve bu argümanda sunduğu tezin transendental idealizmle uyumlu olduğunu savunmaya çalıştılar (Bennet, 1975: 216 & Sidgwick, Caird, 1880. Biz bu çalışmamızda birinci görüşün daha tutarlı olduğunu göstermeye çalışacağız.…”

Kant's Argument for the Principle of Anticipations of Perception

“…Accordingly, the schematization of "limitation," namely the presentation of an infinite sphere of possible realities in time, is also 27 Guyer (1987) 32 Even if this a turns out to be a group of realities, the schema of "reality" does not present it as a manifold as such.…”