Kant and Skepticism

Forster, Michael N.

doi:10.1515/9781400824403

Cited by 6 publications

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“…To sort out the problem, Kant has to add a wing to nature that would accommodate it. Kant calls this wing "supersensuous nature" (Forster, 2010), and he indicates that here the moral law could enter into nature and become the foundation of natural law. The moral law, according to Kant:…”

Section: The Connection Between Laws Subsequent To Kantmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Philosophy of Law of Immanuel Kant

Varaba

Berebon²

2022

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Immanuel Kant, the eminent Western philosopher, discusses several significant themes in the context of political ideas that are strewn across his various books. In this study, one of the challenges is to organise Kant’s valuable notes on political ideas in a systematic yet critical manner to reflect his philosophy of law. Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophies have influenced the idea of law, which is an a priori concept of the human mind, in several ways. It is also conceivable, by virtue of Kant’s philosophy of law, to identify the inherent connection between moral and political philosophy. This study will illustrate the connection between the moral and political philosophy of Immanuel Kant and the philosophy of law. This work is carried out through the method of context and critical analysis. This work is organised into three sections. The first portion of the introduction will analyse the definition of law and its connection to the philosophy of law; the second part will study the broad notion of law and its different varieties; and the third section will investigate whether Kant’s political philosophy is consistent enough to accommodate the different types of laws. This work submits that Kant’s philosophy is quite consistent with the philosophy of law. In particular, this work submits that there is a theoretical link between Kant’s political philosophy and natural law, moral law, political law, international law, and cosmopolitan law.

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Section: The Connection Between Laws Subsequent To Kantmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Philosophy of Law of Immanuel Kant

Varaba

Berebon²

2022

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“…This distinction corresponds to the order in which Kant developed his critical philosophy, but not to the structure of the Critique of Pure Reason. Taking issue withForster (2008) andGuyer (2008), Chance (2012) argues convincingly that for Kant Pyrrhonian and Humean skepticism have much in common (328). However, it does not follow from Kant's endorsement of Hume's criticism of (special) metaphysics that "Kant's project in the Critique is to a large extent a Humean one", as Chance maintains (329).…”

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Kant’s Response to Hume’s Critique of Pure Reason

Boer

2019

Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie

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In this article I argue that Kant considered Hume’s account of causality in the Enquiry to be primarily relevant because it undermines proofs for the existence of God and, moreover, that this interpretation is plausible and text-based. What the Prolegomena calls ‘Hume’s problem’ is, I claim, the more general question as to whether metaphysics can achieve synthetic a priori knowledge of objects at all. Whereas Hume denied this possibility, I show how the solution Kant develops in the Critique of Pure Reason is in agreement with Hume’s critique of dogmatic metaphysics, but salvages the synthetic a priori principles he takes to be constitutive of empirical cognition.

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“…This would agree with readings of Kant's transcendental arguments that emphasize the Pyrrhonian nature of the problems discussed in the Transcendental Dialectic (cf. Forster, ; Guyer, : ch. 1).…”

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Kant, the Third Antinomy and Transcendental Arguments

Gava

2018

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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In this paper, I consider whether a reading of Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy can offer material for devising a new model of transcendental argument. The problem that this form of argument is meant to address is an antinomy between two apparently contradictory claims, q and ¬q, where we seem equally justified in holding both. The model has the following form: p; q is a necessary condition of p; the only justification we have for q is that it is a necessary condition of p; p is justified only in domain X (where X is a domain of objects of cognition); therefore, q is justified only in domain X. Because the argument shows that our justification for q is valid only in X, it also establishes that there is conceptual space to hold ¬q outside of X.

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Kant and Skepticism

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

The Philosophy of Law of Immanuel Kant

The Philosophy of Law of Immanuel Kant

Kant’s Response to Hume’s Critique of Pure Reason

Kant, the Third Antinomy and Transcendental Arguments

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