2001
DOI: 10.1108/09555340110391284
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Kalecki, any old idiot and the European Central Bank

Abstract: If we accept the logic of mainstream free-market ideology-based macroeconomic theory, the European Central Bank should, to maximise economic efficiency, be independent of political influence. It is easy to forget that such an understanding of the economy was discredited by the great 1930s slump and banished from government policy in the``Golden Age '' of capitalism, between 1950 and 1973. Proposes to move beyond the free-market/monetarist/new-classical consensus to consider if the row over who should head th… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…As part of the post 1979 international ideological switch to the right rentier representatives have increasingly been granted guardianship of apparently democratic countries’ macroeconomic policy. The new independent European Central Bank now eagerly worries about inflation and labour market inflexibility (see Potts, 2001). We should not be surprised if rentier representatives guard rentier interests, i.e.…”
Section: Conclusion: Inflation “Public” Enemy Number Onementioning
confidence: 99%
“…As part of the post 1979 international ideological switch to the right rentier representatives have increasingly been granted guardianship of apparently democratic countries’ macroeconomic policy. The new independent European Central Bank now eagerly worries about inflation and labour market inflexibility (see Potts, 2001). We should not be surprised if rentier representatives guard rentier interests, i.e.…”
Section: Conclusion: Inflation “Public” Enemy Number Onementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Euro zone members have thus already abandoned control of their macroeconomic fates. For the euro zone's institutional structure to change there must be unanimous agreement at an intergovernmental conference, such a prospect is remote, to the dissatisfaction of French socialist hopes of democratic control of euro zone macroeconomic policy (Potts, 2001). For the UK there is still a choice [1].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%