Justifying Subsistence Emissions: An Appeal to Causal Impotence

Vance, Chad

doi:10.1007/s10790-021-09840-y

Cited by 2 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…In my (Vance, 2023), I highlighted the above conclusions as an upshot of accepting our individual causal impotence. For, it is not so clear that subsistence emissions are morally justified if our individual emissions do cause significant harm to others.…”

Section: What If Our Individual Actions Make No Difference?mentioning

confidence: 93%

“…I think it is. In order to argue for this conclusion, I will first provide a brief survey of some of the moral claims that I have argued for elsewhere (Vance 2017(Vance , 2023. I will then apply that framework to the issue of procreation.…”

Section: What If Our Individual Actions Make No Difference?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Interestingly, subsistence emissions remain all-things-considered permissible on this proposal, even though they too contribute to the collective harm. To illustrate, consider another case, from my (Vance, 2023):…”

Section: What If Our Individual Actions Make No Difference?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Meanwhile, the wrongness associated with your contribution is not overridden in the Light Exercise case, because the benefit of contributing to the collective harm in that case is so trivial. On these grounds, I have argued (Vance 2023) that, even if our individual contributions to climate change make no difference to the total amount of harm that occurs, our luxury emissions are still immoral, while our subsistence emissions are not.…”

Section: What If Our Individual Actions Make No Difference?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For, such behaviors contribute to climate change and environmental destruction-which ultimately causes significant harm to others. I endorse this position, and have argued for it elsewhere (Vance 2017(Vance , 2023. Here, I will defend a further claim: If there is (as I believe) a duty to minimize our resource consumption and greenhouse gas emissions by refraining from the sorts of behaviors just listed, then there is also a duty to refrain from having children.…”

mentioning

confidence: 93%

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Procreation is Immoral on Environmental Grounds

Vance

2023

J Ethics

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Some argue that procreation is immoral due to its negative environmental impact. Since living an "eco-gluttonous" lifestyle of excessive resource consumption is wrong in virtue of the fact that it increases greenhouse gas emissions and environmental impact, then bringing another human being into existence must also be wrong, for exactly this same reason. I support this position. It has recently been the subject of criticism, however, primarily on the grounds that such a position (1) is guilty of "double-counting" environmental impacts, and (2) that it over-generalizes to condemn other clearly permissible behaviors, such as saving lives, or certain instances of adoption and immigration. Here, I will defend the environmental argument against procreation from these criticisms. I will do this, first, under the assumption that our individual consumption and emissions cause significant harm. I will then address the problem of causal impotence, and argue that, even if our individual contributions to environmental problems ultimately make no difference to the amount of harm that occurs, procreation is still immoral for many, if not most, of those living in the developed world.

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Section: What If Our Individual Actions Make No Difference?mentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: What If Our Individual Actions Make No Difference?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: What If Our Individual Actions Make No Difference?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: What If Our Individual Actions Make No Difference?mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 93%

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Procreation is Immoral on Environmental Grounds

Vance

2023

J Ethics

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Why it Can Be Permissible to Have Kids in the Climate Emergency

Cripps

2024

J Applied Philosophy

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Having a child is one of the highest‐carbon decisions made by affluent individuals. Does this uncomfortable fact mean they should limit biological family size? This salient question also forces attention to two key issues. One is just how demanding individual climate justice duties are. The other is the danger of ‘ivory tower’ reasoning by privileged philosophers. On some topics, it is imperative carefully to integrate philosophical discussion with sociological and psychological research. Assuming individual climate justice duties include cutting one's carbon impact, the discussion goes as follows. Should affluent couples and individuals have no biological children, because of the carbon cost? Not unless emissions‐cutting duties are extremely demanding, or we make dangerous, generalised socio‐psychological assumptions. Is there any individual duty to consider carbon impact when determining family size? Yes, because individual emissions‐cutting duties are more than trivially demanding. Should all duty‐bearers ‘stop at’ some fixed maximum number of biological kids? Not unless that number is one and we are prepared to accept very demanding individual emissions‐cutting duties and make problematic sociological assumptions. Finally, the article outlines three further individual duties following from the ‘uncomfortable fact’: to raise good climate citizens, become activists, and cut the family carbon footprint.

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Justifying Subsistence Emissions: An Appeal to Causal Impotence

Cited by 2 publications

References 27 publications

Procreation is Immoral on Environmental Grounds

Procreation is Immoral on Environmental Grounds

Why it Can Be Permissible to Have Kids in the Climate Emergency

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