Justifications of Inequality: The Normative Basis of Pay Differentials in 31 Nations^*

Abstract

Objectives. We investigate social consensus and dissensus within and between nations in three important justifications for pay differences: family needs, performance on the job, and education/authority. Methods. Data are from 31 nations and 66,777 individual respondents analyzed using structural equation and multilevel regression methods with multiple imputation of missing data. Results. In poor countries, but not in rich, most believe that family needs legitimate higher pay. Within countries-particularly English-speaking ones-low SES groups endorse family needs, but high SES groups reject them. Valuing performance and effort is widespread throughout the world and throughout all segments of society, high and low. Education and authority are widely valued, more in poor nations than in rich, with some demographic differences but few socioeconomic cleavages. Conclusions. There is conflict both within nations and between them as to whether need and education/authority justify unequal pay, but consensus that performance on the job does justify it.

(In)Equality and (In)Justice

“…For at least some individuals, for example, the only just division of a fixed pie is equality (Evans, Kelley and Peoples, 2010;Liebig and Sauer, 2016;van den Bos et al, 2015).…”

“…This is a classic question in the study of justice as in all processes involving a reference individual or reference group. As discussed above, there is a wide range of sources of the just reward, and a useful approach must accommodate them (Evans, Kelley, and Peoples, 2010;Diekmann, 2004;Liebig and Sauer, 2016).…”

“…The relation between X and X* can be approached in two ways: (1) focusing on the individual's choice of the just reward, which could be, say, the arithmetic mean E(X), the geometric mean G(X), or the multiplicative function kX, or any other amount (Evans, Kelley and Peoples, 2010;Diekmann, 2004;Liebig and Sauer, 2016); or (2) focusing on the ARD and the JRD. In this paper, we follow the first approach, leaving the second approach to future work.…”

“…Yet even that large matrix is at best a skeleton, for each cell of the matrix must accommodate a multiplicity of justice situations and, in particular, a multiplicity of ideas of the just reward for self or others (Diekmann, 2004;Dubins and Spanier, 1961;Evans, Kelley and Peoples, 2010;Jasso, Törnblom, and Sabbagh, 2016;Liebig and Sauer, 2016). The just reward may be an amount directly selected (envisioned, desired, etc.…”

“…The scenarios cover, among others, the well-known equality scenario and the compare-to-all scenario in which each person's just reward reflects comparison to the actual rewards of every other person in the group or population (Evans, Kelley and Peoples, 2010;Diekmann,2004;Liebig and Sauer, 2016).…”