Justification without Awareness

Bergmann, Michael

doi:10.1093/0199275742.001.0001

Cited by 316 publications

(110 citation statements)

References 70 publications

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“…While they have the same phenomenal evidence, Matt's counterpart has additional factive evidence. This externalist response to the New Evil Demon Problem differs from traditional externalist responses (see Goldman 1993;Sosa 1991;Bergmann 2006) insofar as it rejects the claim that Matt and his counterpart could have the very same evidence, while accepting that the content of one's mental state determines one's evidence.…”

Section: New Evil Demon Scenariomentioning

confidence: 80%

“…It is because a given subject is employing a mental capacity with a certain nature that her mental states have epistemic force. Among capacity views there is a distinction to be drawn between normative capacity views, on which mental capacities are understood as virtues or in other normative ways (Sosa 1991(Sosa , 2006(Sosa , 2007Greco 2001Greco , 2010Bergmann 2006), and capacity views that forego normative terms (Burge 2003;Graham 2011;Schellenberg 2013aSchellenberg , 2014a.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence

Schellenberg

2015

Philos Stud

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Perceptions guide our actions and provide us with evidence of the world around us. Illusions and hallucinations can mislead us: they may prompt as to act in ways that do not mesh with the world around us and they may lead us to form false beliefs about that world. The capacity view provides an account of evidence that does justice to these two facts. It shows in virtue of what illusions and hallucinations mislead us and prompt us to act. Moreover, it shows in virtue of what we are in a better epistemic position when we perceive than when we hallucination. In this paper, I develop the capacity view, that is, the view that perceptual experience has epistemic force in virtue of the epistemic and metaphysical primacy of the perceptual capacities employed in perception. By grounding the epistemic force of experience in facts about the metaphysical structure of experience, the capacity view is not only an externalist view, but moreover a naturalistic view of the epistemology of perceptual experience. So it is an externalist and naturalistic alternative to reliabilism. I discuss the repercussions of this view for the justification of beliefs and the epistemic transparency of mental states, as well as, familiar problem cases.

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Section: New Evil Demon Scenariomentioning

confidence: 80%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence

Schellenberg

2015

Philos Stud

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“…(I take it that reasons and defeaters are intentional states. Defeaters are, in Bergmann's (2006) sense, 'mental state defeaters' and not 'propositional defeaters'.) If a process is reliable, the resulting belief is justified, and no counter-evidence can change that.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introspective Self-Knowledge of Experience and Evidence

Hofmann

2009

Erkenn

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The paper attempts to give an account of the introspective self-knowledge of our own experiences which is in line with representationalism about phenomenal consciousness and the transparency of experience. A two-step model is presented. First, a demonstrative thought of the form 'I am experiencing this' is formed which refers to what one experiences, by means of attention. Plausibly, this thought is knowledge, since safe. Second, a non-demonstrative thought of the form 'I am experiencing a pain' occurs. This second self-ascription is justified inferentially, on the basis of the first, demonstrative thought. Thus, an account of introspective experiential self-knowledge can be developed which is richer and more adequate to the phenomena than pure reliabilism and Dretske's displaced perception model. There is really such a thing as introspection, but no inner sense.

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“…35 As noted above, the worry is not merely that second-order beliefs are required, but that each level of belief formation would seem to require a higher order belief. For worries concerning the need for higher order beliefs see Alston (1988);Bergmann (2006);Schmitt (2001).…”

Section: Gd-theories Of All Stripes Grant That There Is An Important mentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasons for Belief and Normativity

Glüer¹,

Wikforss²

2018

Oxford Handbooks Online

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In this chapter, we critically examine the most important extant ways of understanding and motivating the idea that reasons for belief are normative. First, we examine the proposal that the distinction between explanatory and so-called normative reasons that is commonly drawn in moral philosophy can be rather straightforwardly applied to reasons for belief, and that reasons for belief are essentially normative precisely when they are normative reasons. In the course of this investigation, we explore the very nature of the reasons-for-belief relation, as well as the ontology of such reasons. Second, we examine the idea that the normativity derives from the internal connection between reasons for belief and epistemic justification, distinguishing between two distinct normativist accounts of justification, a weaker and a stronger one. We argue that neither line of argument is compelling. Pending further arguments, we conclude that normativism about reasons for belief is not supported.

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Justification without Awareness

Cited by 316 publications

References 70 publications

Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence

Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence

Introspective Self-Knowledge of Experience and Evidence

Reasons for Belief and Normativity

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