2013
DOI: 10.21236/ada610785
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Justification of a Pattern for Detecting Intellectual Property Theft by Departing Insiders

Abstract: This paper describes an analysis that justifies applying the pattern "Increased Review for Intellectual Property (IP) Theft by Departing Insiders." The pattern helps organizations plan, prepare, and implement a strategy to mitigate the risk of insider theft of IP. The analysis shows that organizations can reduce their risk of insider theft of IP through increased review of departing insiders' actions during a relatively small window of time prior to their departure. Preliminary research results show that appro… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The postcountermeasures look ahead to the notice period of resignation/termination as well as after the insiders leave an organization. Moore et al [71] presented several attacks that are carried out by insiders within a period of 60 days before departure. They stole top-secret information from their organization (e.g., financial reports, business plans, research and development strategies, etc.).…”
Section: Post-countermeasuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The postcountermeasures look ahead to the notice period of resignation/termination as well as after the insiders leave an organization. Moore et al [71] presented several attacks that are carried out by insiders within a period of 60 days before departure. They stole top-secret information from their organization (e.g., financial reports, business plans, research and development strategies, etc.).…”
Section: Post-countermeasuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since 2001, scientists at the CERT Insider Risk Center have recorded pernicious insider action by looking at media reports and court transcripts and leading meetings with the United States Mystery Administration, casualties' associations, and indicted criminals [10]. Among the more than 700 insider risk cases that we've archived, our investigation has distinguished more than 100 classes of shortcomings in frameworks, procedures, individuals or innovations that permitted insider dangers to happen.…”
Section: Effectiveness Of a Pattern For Preventing Theft By Insidersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Current approaches for detecting insiders rely largely on behavioral heuristics based on past insider cases [18]. These approaches fall short in three important ways: (i) they fail to detect novel insider methodologies and attacks; (ii) they fail to detect large-scale data collection within the scope of authorized access permissions; and (iii) they fail to consider forensic traces of information-handling activity in unallocated space.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%