This essay argues that the third-century BC Ruist "masters" text Xúnzǐ presents a sophisticated approach to semantics and epistemology in which a concern with truth is at best secondary, not central. Xúnzǐ's primary concern is with identifying and applying the apt dào (way), which for him is a more fundamental concept that underwrites and explains truth claims. Dào refers to a way or path of personal and social conduct, covering prudential, esthetic, ethical, and political concerns. Xúnzǐ is primarily concerned with whether utterances, along with actions, policies, and social practices, are correct in conforming to dào-specifically, the dào of "good order" (zhì)-rather than whether they are correct in being true. Insofar as he is concerned with truth, he regards the status of assertions as true or not as derivative from their status as following dào or not. A consequence is that for Xúnzǐ questions of value and culture are more basic than questions of truth.
Keywords Truth • Xunzi • Chinese philosophy • Dao • EpistemologyOne way to think about truth is as a guiding norm or end of belief and inquiry. We seek to believe what is true, and inquiry aims at forming true beliefs. Indeed, we can think of a commitment to truth as a constitutive aim of epistemic agency. Part of what it is to be an agent engaged in making judgments and forming beliefs is to aim to represent truly how things are. 1 The central, fundamental place of truth in the structure of belief, inquiry, and discourse can seem so obvious as to be unquestionable. But a useful role of comparative philosophical study can be to help us question the obvious and by so doing better understand it. Comparative inquiry can help us identify assumptions we take for granted and possible alternatives to these assumptions.