Justice, Territory and Natural Resources

Abstract

Territorial self‐determination and global distributive justice seem to be at loggerheads. Cosmopolitans hold that institutions such as states can be justified only derivatively on global justice. But ‘self‐determinists’ insist that territorial self‐determination is independently significant. The current article hypothesizes that the core disagreement is not over the justification of global resource egalitarianism, but rather over the conception of resources per se. The article presents three conceptions of resources – the familiar ‘natural resources’ conception, Tim Hayward's ‘physical’ conception and Ronald Dworkin's ‘constructivist’ conception – and argues that, particularly when appended to egalitarian global distribution principles, each is importantly flawed. The article then presents and defends an ‘intentional’ conception of resources as fungible means. This account treats resources as intentional kinds rather than natural kinds. As such, they can be identified only after discerning whose intentional states are decisive in a given case. Discerning that is the role of a theory of territorial rights. A resource is such when the morally legitimate territorial right‐holder treats it as a fungible means. The theory of territorial rights is universal, and the resource distribution principle is morally cosmopolitan; but the determination of what counts as a resource is claimant‐relative, respecting self‐determination. The article then works out implications for global justice, with special attention to the global environment and through comparisons with Hayward's eco‐space egalitarianism. The result is a sketch of a unified theory of global resource justice, giving due weight to both cosmopolitan egalitarianism and to territorial self‐determination.

Self-Determination and Resource Rights: In Defence of Territorial Jurisdiction Over Natural Resources

“…Cara Nine (2012, p. 117) puts forth the political justice 5 Some of the normative controversy about resource rights connects to disagreement about their definition-in particular to whether the subjective value for humans is intrinsic to the very definition of an object as a resource, see, e.g., Kolers (2012), Hayward (2006). 6 For discussion of models and conceptions of resource rights see e.g., Nine (2012, Ch.…”

Who owns it? Three arguments for land claims in latin america

“…The people making the claims may have what Anna Stilz (2013) has called "located life plans" connected to the areas that they are claiming. So the significance of a claim will sometimes depend on the importance of the way of life of the community for its members, and in particular how the continuity of the community protects their interests in maintaining relationships and advancing life projects in the place where those projects and relationships have previously been developed and pursued (Kolers 2012). …”

Beyond the national resource privilege: towards an International Court of the Environment

“…5 The only group of philosophers which has repeatedly questioned the resource privilege are cosmopolitan liberal egalitarians like Charles Beitz (1979), Brian Barry (1982) and Paula Casal (2011) who argue that since all human beings are morally equal and the distribution of natural resources from a moral point of view arbitrary all people should have an equal claim to an equal share of the world's natural resources. 7 Apart from these two groups, within current normative political theory only the literature on territorial rights deals with the issue of control over natural resources (Meisels 2005;Nine 2008Nine , 2012Kolers 2009Kolers , 2012Miller 2012;Moore 2012). 7 Apart from these two groups, within current normative political theory only the literature on territorial rights deals with the issue of control over natural resources (Meisels 2005;Nine 2008Nine , 2012Kolers 2009Kolers , 2012Miller 2012;Moore 2012).…”