Just a Lobbyist?

Abstract

A B S T R A C TThe role of the European Parliament (EP) under the consultation procedure has been widely neglected by rational choice models of legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU). This paper offers a new understanding of the procedure by means of a computational model in which lobbyists provide legislators with policy options. Transaction costs of assimilating information lead to rationing of access to the agenda-setter (i.e. the Commission). In this context, consultation converts the EP into an indirect channel to the agenda-setter for some lobbyists. I argue that the resulting pool of policy options, together with the right to be heard by the Commission and the latter's degree of rational ignorance, provides the EP with a legislative power that the literature has not so far recognized. The implications of this finding extend to other legislative procedures of the EU and to consultative committees in other political systems.

Leading the Band or Just Playing the Tune? Reassessing the Agenda-Setting Powers of the European Commission

“…These analyses suggest that Commission policy initiatives are actually the result of political bargains between the Council and the Parliament during the process of appointing Commission members (Crombez & Hix, 2011). Other research focuses on leadership factors and internal debates (Daviter, 2007), party loyalties (Hix, 2008), the national interests of the Commissioners (Wessels, 2008; Wonka, 2008), or the influences of lobbyists (Varela, 2009) and interest groups in general (Sherrington, 2000). Likewise, by tracing the evolution of the EU legislative processes, 13 others point to the gradual erosion of the Commission’s agenda-setting powers vis-à-vis other EU institutions (Bocquillon & Dobbels, 2013; Corona, Hermanin, & Ponzano, 2012; Diedrichs & Wessels, 2006; Rasmussen, 2007; Tsebelis, 2008; Tsebelis & Garrett, 2001).…”

“… 4. See, for example, recent research on the indirect agenda-setting influence of the European Council through summit conclusions (Allerkamp, 2010; Reh, Heritier, Bressanelli, & Koop, 2013) or lobbying organizations (Greenwood, 2011; Varela, 2009). …”

Protection, participation and legitimacy: the European Union’s public consultation system and ethnic and national minorities

“…During this period, lobbyists may have the opportunity to steer the weeding out of possible policy options in a direction they prefer. This, in combination with the relative high degree of rational ignorance of EU agenda-setting institutions like the European Commission, gives lobbyists a considerable indirect agenda-setting power (Varela 2009).…”