Juries, Lay Judges, and Trials

Goldbach, Toby S.

doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-5690-2_39

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Insofar as professional judges are better than lay judges at "overrid[ing] their intuitive reactions with complex, deliberative thought," they are thought to be better equipped at handling complex legal arguments (Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2007, p. 9;Pettersson, Dahlman, & Sarwar, 2018). Conversely, scholars have raised concerns that lay judges are more likely to base their judgments on intuition and emotion (Diesen, 2001;Goldbach & Hans, 2014). Both groups of judges therefore probably differ in how persuasive they find a generalization argument, a difference that counts as soon as one group has the majority.…”

Section: Professional Vs Lay Judgesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hypothesis 3: expertise effect in persuasiveness-ratings Evaluating an argument's persuasiveness properly requires both training and experience (Goldbach & Hans, 2014). A difference in expertise thus entails that professional judges should be on average better at this than lay judges.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Complex argumentation generally is difficult to evaluate, the main reason why lawyers receive extensive training in argumentation (Clements, 2013;Goldbach & Hans, 2014;Toye, 2013). To investigate whether legal training compares positively to social science trainingby raising awareness for the persuasive effect of using generalizationswe asked law and social science students to identify the argument version (generalized vs. specific) they would rather select in order to convince a judge and jury.…”

Section: Legal Trainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Because understanding complex argumentation properly requires training, hypothesis 3 predicts that professional judges do on average arrive at more accurate persuasiveness rating than lay judges, who lack such training (Goldbach & Hans, 2014). (Here, "more accurate" means that a judgment better traces a case's facts.)…”

Section: Expertise Effect In Judging Argument Strengthmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Generalization in Legal Argumentation

Zenker

Dahlman

Sikström

et al. 2019

Journal of Forensic Psychology Research and Practice

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When interpreting a natural language argument that generalizes over a contextually relevant category, audiences are likely to activate the category prototype and transfer its characteristics onto category instances. A generalized argument can thus appear more (respectively less) persuasive than one mentioning a specific category instance, provided the argument's claim is more (less) warranted for the prototype than for the instance (positive and negative prototype effect). To investigate this effect in legal contexts using mock-scenarios, professional and lay judges at Swedish courts evaluated the persuasiveness of arguments giving a generalized or a specific description of an eyewitness. The generalized version described the witness either as an alcoholintoxicated person or as a child, while the specific version varied both the amount of alcohol consumed (two vs. five glasses of wine) and the child's age (four vs. 12 years). To investigate the effect of legal expertise on argument selection, moreover, law and social science students evaluate the persuasiveness of both argument versions. Though we observed statistically significant prototype effects as well as expertise effects, results were mixed and sometimes ran counter to normative expectation.

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Section: Professional Vs Lay Judgesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Legal Trainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Expertise Effect In Judging Argument Strengthmentioning

confidence: 99%

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