Publisher's copyright statement: NOTICE: this is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in The Journal of Economic Asymmetries. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be re ected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A de nitive version was subsequently published in The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, 12, 1, June 2015, 10.1016/j.jeca.2015.01.003.
Additional information:Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. Abstract Does the uni…cation of retail and investment banking necessarily heighten risk in …-nancial markets? Using a simple two period intertemporal model with borrower's moral hazard and uninsured risk, we argue that the integration in …nancial service markets under universal banking could give rise to a greater risk sharing arrangement. This could eliminate the stock market premium attributed to borrower's moral hazard. Absent any other frictions, we show that there is an unambiguous output and welfare gain from switching to a universal banking system from retail banking because of this e¢ cient risk sharing. This welfare gain is higher in economies prone to greater information friction caused by borrower's moral hazard.