Jung's dissociable psyche and the ec‐static self

Abstract

Much of Jung's later work assumes that the self is an a priori phenomenon in which centripetal dynamics dominate. There is, however, another current in Jung's writings which recognizes the self to be an emergent phenomenon. This view is increasingly prevalent in post-Jungian discourse, and Louis Zinkin's exploration of a post-Jungian-constructivist model of the self can be seen as part of this tendency. My paper privileges an emergent understanding of the self by focusing on the 'unravelling', 'de-centring', centrifugal experiences of otherness in the psyche. It offers a post-Jungian reading of a number of writers who have been influenced by the psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche and proposes a model of the self which focuses on our fantasies, terrors and longings about coming undone and bringing others undone. This model is then linked to Judith Butler's understanding of the self as an ec-static phenomenon, in which the self is, of necessity, outside itself, such that 'there is no final moment in which my return to myself takes place'. I suggest that Jung's early clinical researches into the dissociability of the psyche and the clinical tools which he developed as a result of this work are especially suitable for engaging with these emergent, centrifugal dynamics.

The ethical dimensions of life and analytic work through a Levinasian lens

“…Jung simply, in my mind, because of his foundationalist presuppositions, did not make the 'turn' from knowledge viewed as a product of the mind to Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology', which focuses on a non-Cartesian understanding of the presencing of being in everyday social and historical contexts. There are evidences however, that Jung anticipated such a turn most noted in his phenomenological descriptive approach developed early in his career in his association test researches (see Austin, 2009;Vezzoli et al, 2007) and in his immanent critique of such emerging phenomena from the patient. For a contemporary application of this crucial insight, see Cambray, 2006;Cambray, Gaillard, Gibeault, Gastelumendi & Kast, 2011.…”

“…Contemporary Jungian theorists have continued to challenge Jung's basic assumptions about the conditions of subject formation that are embedded in a foundationalist problematic such as the 'Self'. There has been an increasing emphasis on inter-subjective approaches and an ethos surrounding the crucial presence of 'the other' that cannot be completely understood (Austin, 2009;Gullatz, 2010;Hinton, 2009, p. 638;Horne, 2008).…”

Working with chronic and relentless self‐hatred, self‐harm and existential shame: a clinical study and reflections

“…In order to expand on how (to use Laplanche's language) I try to remain aware that I do not ‘know’, I will start from a point of intersection between Jung's work and Laplanche's, which I explored in a previous paper (Austin , pp. 332–33).…”

Embodied female experience through the lens of imagination

“…A sense of identity protects one from the anxiety generated by the disturbing ‘otherness’ of others (Horne 2008) and results in efforts to generate ‘the same and the same’‘repeatedly, over and over’ in order to avoid this anxiety. Through analysis, we learn that this feeling of identity permanence is actually defensive and illusory and can be transformed in a variety of ways (Austin 2009; Hinton 2009; Horne 2009). Although our ‘ego complex’ (Jung 1934) or our ‘narrative consciousness’ (Damasio 1999) maintains an ongoing ‘sense of self’ over time, this temporal sense of self remains multiple, decentred, and fragmented (Austin 2009; Hinton 2009; Horne 2009) and appears as moods that are the signifiers of self‐states, i.e.…”

“…Through analysis, we learn that this feeling of identity permanence is actually defensive and illusory and can be transformed in a variety of ways (Austin 2009; Hinton 2009; Horne 2009). Although our ‘ego complex’ (Jung 1934) or our ‘narrative consciousness’ (Damasio 1999) maintains an ongoing ‘sense of self’ over time, this temporal sense of self remains multiple, decentred, and fragmented (Austin 2009; Hinton 2009; Horne 2009) and appears as moods that are the signifiers of self‐states, i.e. the various characters with whom we identify in our stories (Heidegger 1962; Oliver 2002; Horne 2004).…”