Abstract:We study a sequential Bertrand game with one dominant market incumbent and multiple small entrants selling homogeneous products. Whilst the equilibrium for the case of a single entrant is well known from Gelman and Salop (1983), we derive properties of the -firm equilibrium and present an algorithm that can be used to calculate this equilibrium. The algorithm is based on a recursive manipulation of polynomials that derive the optimisation problem that each of the market entrants is facing. Using this algorithm… Show more
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