Judicial quality, contract intensity and trade: Firm-level evidence from developing and transition countries

Ma, Yue; Qu, Baozhi; Zhang, Yifan

doi:10.1016/j.jce.2009.09.002

Cited by 57 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…and Ma et al (2010) also supports the idea that hold-up costs from a weak judiciary may distort the comparative advantage of some industries through an influence on their input structure, though outcomes are measured in terms of exporting rather than increasing firm size. Such findings may suggest that improving legal institutions allows firms to better specialize by reducing transactions costs (see Williamson, 2005).…”

supporting

confidence: 57%

Legal Reform, Contract Enforcement and Firm Size in Mexico

Dougherty

2014

Rev International Economics

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The variation in legal system quality across states in Mexico is used to examine the relationship between judicial quality and firm size over the course of the 2000s, when systemic changes were taking place. Using economic census microdata and survey-based measures of legal institutions, a robust effect of judicial quality is observed on the firm size distribution and efficiency, instrumenting for underlying historical determinants of institutions. Indicative evidence is found that the effect is strongest in more capital-intensive industries. Market size and distance-to-market are also found to matter for firm size outcomes, consistent with the new trade literature.

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confidence: 57%

Legal Reform, Contract Enforcement and Firm Size in Mexico

Dougherty

2014

Rev International Economics

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“…Similar to the works of Borrmann et al (2006), Dollar and Kraay (2003), Levchenko (2007Levchenko ( , 2011, Ma et al (2010), and Doyle and Martinez-Zarzoso (2011), this article utilizes the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) to capture six broad categories of institutional quality: (1) Voice and Accountability, (2) Political Stability and the Absence of Violence and Terrorism, (3) Government Effectiveness, (4) Regulatory Quality, (5) Rule of Law and (6) Control of Corruption. Each WGI index ranges from -2.5 (weak governance) to 2.5 (strong governance), as reflected by the global perceptions of government and nongovernment agencies and private businesses.…”

Section: Estimation Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional quality as a barrier to trade

Briggs

2013

Applied Economics Letters

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Improvement of institutional quality abroad encourages new domestic firms to export to these countries, but has no effect on the volume of exports from incumbent firms. Thus, poor institutional quality acts as a barrier to the extensive margin of trade. As a result, policies that encourage the strengthening of foreign institutions coincide with national export initiatives such as the one launched by President Obama in 2010.

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“…Another approach is to use the firms' assessment of institutional quality(Ma et al, 2010). However we do not observe management practices and assessment of corruption for the same firms.3 We have also extracted the first principal component of the eight household answers using the whole dataset with all individual responses(Tabellini, 2010), and computed their regional average.…”

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confidence: 99%

Corruption and management practices: Firm level evidence

Athanasouli

Goujard

2015

Journal of Comparative Economics

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Available online xxx JEL Classfication: H11 K42 L2 Keywords: Management Institutions Corruption Firm governance a b s t r a c t Athanasouli, Daphne, and Goujard, Antoine-Corruption and management practices: Firm level evidenceWe argue that corruption can decrease aggregate productivity by deteriorating firm management practices. We investigate the impact of regional corruption on the management quality of firms within the manufacturing sector in Central and Eastern Europe. The empirical challenge is that bureaucrats' bribing practices may evolve in response to firm behaviors, and that regional corruption is measured with error. To identify causal effects, our preferred specifications use a difference-in-differences methodology. We measure the manufacturing industries' exposure to corruption using their level of dependence to contract institutions. Controlling for regional and manufacturing industry -country fixed effects, we find that firms in more contract dependent industries, located in more corrupt regions, tend to have lower management quality, a more centralized decision-making process, and a lower level of education among administrative staff. In more corrupt regions, contract dependent firms are also characterized by lower investment in R&D, and smaller product markets. We show that our findings are not likely to be driven by omitted variables, outliers, or reverse causality. Journal of Comparative Economics 000 () (2015) 1-21.

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Judicial quality, contract intensity and trade: Firm-level evidence from developing and transition countries

Cited by 57 publications

References 58 publications

Legal Reform, Contract Enforcement and Firm Size in Mexico

Legal Reform, Contract Enforcement and Firm Size in Mexico

Institutional quality as a barrier to trade

Corruption and management practices: Firm level evidence

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