2015
DOI: 10.1086/681437
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Judicial Majoritarianism

Abstract: For decades, constitutional theorists have confronted the normative problems associated with judicial review by an unelected judiciary; yet, some political scientists contend that judicial review actually tends to promote majoritarian interests. We evaluate the majoritarian nature of judicial review and test the political foundations that shape this process. To do so, we construct a statute-centered data set of every important federal law enacted from 1949 through 2008 and estimate the probability of a law bei… Show more

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Cited by 27 publications
(25 citation statements)
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“… We invoke the literature on the so‐called countermajoritarian dilemma only loosely and with full recognition of the many nuances and debates that exist in the literature. For illustrations, see Pildes () and Hall and Ura ().…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“… We invoke the literature on the so‐called countermajoritarian dilemma only loosely and with full recognition of the many nuances and debates that exist in the literature. For illustrations, see Pildes () and Hall and Ura ().…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Presidential partisanship substantially influences the ideological location of policymaking throughout the federal government (e.g. Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman, 2005;Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor, 1993;Edwards, 1976Edwards, , 1980Kriner and Reeves, 2015;Peake, 2001) (Perry, 1994;Merrill, 2018), the influence of the president's Solicitor General on the Court's decisions (Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman, 2005;Caplan, 1987), the Court's strategic deference to the elected branches of national government (Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist, 2011;Hall and Ura, 2015;Whittington, 2005), the effect of president's Supreme Court appointments (Dahl, 1957;Funston, 1975;Segal, Timpone, and Howard, 2000), and other factors. Also, more impressionisticly, Americans may reasonably see the Supreme Court as part of the "dominant national alliance," along with those in control of Congress and the executive branch (Dahl 1957, p. 293).…”
Section: Uations Of the Supreme Courtmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although some scholars dispute characterizing judicial review as a countermajoritarian institution (Dahl, ; Hall and Ura, ; Klarman, ; Rogers, , ), many American constitutional theorists and legal scholars argue that courts' ability to act contrary to the will of the majority is a virtue, a feature and not a bug (e.g., Chemerinsky, ; Dworkin, ; Ely, ). From this view, judicial review provides a mechanism for remedying some public inequalities that disadvantage persistent minorities.…”
Section: Majority Rule Minority Rights and Judicial Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%