Judicial independence in the EU: a puzzle

Abstract

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Board diversity reforms: Do they matter for EU bank performance?

“…However, the significance of the interaction term for the standard deviation of stock returns suggests a negative incremental effect of reforms in countries more open to diversity, that is, in these countries, the overall effect is that reforms decrease bank risk. Countries' cultural traits are of fundamental importance for the quality of formal institutions and for the effective implementation of reforms, even in societies as highly developed as the EU member states (Gutmann & Voigt, 2018). Cultural traits enhancing equality, independence from political influence or individual status have also been proved to be conducive to economic growth (Voigt, Gutmann, & Feld, 2015).…”

Judicial independence: Why does de facto diverge from de jure?

“…(2) What additional conditions are necessary for de jure aspects to have any significant effect on de facto? Drawing on data from the EU Justice Scoreboard, Gutmann and Voigt (2020) identify a puzzle: de facto JI on the national level (as perceived by the citizens of EU member states) is negatively associated with formal legislation usually considered conducive to judicial independence, that is, de jure JI. 2 The negative association is more pronounced in the "old" member states than in the "young" ones in Central and Eastern Europe, implying that the relationship is not driven by countries that were striving to become members of the European Union and simply passed independence-enhancing legislation without changing anything on the ground.…”

Transparency and corruption: Measuring real transparency by a new index

“…Furthermore, Guillermo O'Donnell (1996, p. 42) highlighted that “In many countries of the global East and South, there is an old and deep split between the pays reel and the pays legal .” So, a real separation can exist between formal ( de jure ) laws and informal ( de facto ) rules of the game. Gutmann and Voigt (2020) reported this gap for rule of law (only a poor correlation exists between formal rules [constitutional arrangements] and informal norms [independence of the judiciary or lack of]). Mungiu‐Pippidi and Dadašov (2017) also found an implementation gap when anticorruption was concerned (the most corrupt countries have the most comprehensive anticorruption legislation).…”