Judicial Incentives and Performance at Lower Courts: Evidence from Slovenian Judge-Level Data

Abstract

Empirical studies of judicial behavior using judge-level data are scarce and almost exclusively focused on higher court judges in the U.S. The majority of disputes in any legal system, however, are adjudicated by lower court judges and conclusions about judicial behavior from one legal system cannot be generalized to other legal systems. This paper draws on unique judge-level data to study judicial performance at lower courts in Slovenia, a post-socialist member state of the European Union struggling with implementation of an effective judicial system. We first examine the determinants of judicial productivity and elucidate the role of a judge's demographic characteristics, education, experience, salary, promotion concerns, and case specialization. We then explore the possible tradeoff between the quantity and the quality of judicial case resolution, shedding light on the benefits and costs of those legal reform measures that aim to increase judicial productivity in Slovenian lower courts.

Mandatory Retirement for Judges Improved the Performance of US State Supreme Courts

“…Notwithstanding the salient examples mentioned in the introduction, the previous statistical studies of how aging influences judge performance have provided only mixed evidence (e.g. Posner, 1995;Smyth and Bhattacharya, 2003;Manning et al, 2004;Teitelbaum, 2006;Dimitrova-Grajzl et al, 2012). Here we show that the reform reduced judge age, and then we ask whether performance tends to decrease with age.…”

Determinants of Judicial Efficiency in Morocco

“…Furthermore, Ferro et al (2018) and Dimitrova-Grajzl et al (2012) found no significant relationship between a judge's service length or gender and court productivity. Elbialy and Garcia-Rubio (2011), on the other hand, confirmed that only high-ranking judges increase productivity and efficiency in Egyptian courts.…”

“…Regarding the influence of court human resources, Santos and Amado (2014) indicated that courts with a higher proportion of administrative staff are more efficient than those with a higher proportion of judges. On the other hand, some studies (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al, 2012;Schneider, 2005) highlight the academic level of judges and indicate that the higher a judge's level of education (for example, a doctorate), the more efficient the court. Other studies emphasize the significance of the court's management performance, which is directly related to the court president's profile.…”

“…Thus, Ferro et al (2018) indicated that the seniority of clerks positively affects efficiency, while there is no proven relationship between the gender of staff and efficiency. Dimitrova-Grajzl et al (2012) underlined that there is no relationship between the experience of clerks and the productivity of a court. They believe that the experience of judges and their specialization is more important than the seniority or experience of court clerks.…”

Court Disposition Time in Brazil and in European Countries

“…The legal agents in the judicial system may end up struggling to keep the clearance rate at this level for such a long time. Moreover, the pressure on judges will decrease by the time the backlog also starts decreasing, which usually reduces judicial productivity (BEENSTOCK and HAITOVSKY, 2004;DIMITROVA-GRAJZL et al, 2012;GOMES, GUIMARAES and AKUTSU, 2017).…”