Judicial Deference to Inconsistent Agency Statutory Interpretations

Givati, Yehonatan; Stephenson, Matthew C.

doi:10.1086/658407

Cited by 10 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Factors leading to greater deference by courts may include: the degree of insulation and time in operation of the regulatory agency (MEAZELL, 2012); the reputation of the regulatory agency (MAGGETTI and PAPADOPOULOS, 2016); the excessive complexity of cases, which may even encourage "superdeference" on certain issues (MEAZELL, 2011); the thematic area of action and strategic behavior of the agencies with a view to anticipating future judicial decisions (MAGILL and VERMEULE, 2011). There would be less judicial deference in cases of ideological divergence between regulatory agencies and courts, especially when the regulatory body reviews its own position over time (GIVATI and STEPHENSON, 2011).…”

Section: The Different Rationalities Governing Regulatory Agencies Anmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory agencies and courts: interactions between administration and justice

Silva

Guimarães

2020

Cad. EBAPE.BR

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Resumo As inter-relações entre agências reguladoras e tribunais judiciais constituem tema de alto impacto nas relações sociais em geral, porém, ainda carecem de pesquisas empíricas e maior sistematização do conhecimento, sob uma perspectiva multidisciplinar. Nessa linha, este ensaio tem por objetivo realizar uma discussão articulada das principais tensões entre o Poder Executivo e o Poder Judiciário em decisões inerentes à atividade regulatória, apoiada nas principais lentes teóricas e no estado da arte aplicáveis ao fenômeno. O relacionamento entre agências e tribunais é marcado por dicotomias e a abordagem institucional do espaço regulatório e as reflexões trazidas pela Análise Econômica do Direito, dentre outras lentes de análise, revelam-se bastante úteis para a interpretação das tensões institucionais existentes em tal relacionamento. A literatura sobre revisão judicial de decisões de agências reguladoras aponta pesquisas sobre fatores que explicam a deferência judicial ou motivam um papel mais proeminente dos tribunais, passando também por temas relativos a: a) envolvimento de tribunais com questões técnicas e científicas; b) eficiência e desempenho; c) comportamentos calculados; d) custos de transação; e e) análises de custo-benefício. Propõe-se uma agenda de pesquisa que explore percepções de atores-chave desse ambiente acerca de litígios regulatórios, bem como estudos sobre fatores e condicionantes que explicam a deferência judicial em diferentes contextos.

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Section: The Different Rationalities Governing Regulatory Agencies Anmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory agencies and courts: interactions between administration and justice

Silva

Guimarães

2020

Cad. EBAPE.BR

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“…The availability heuristic plays havoc with judges’ capacity to resolve issues of statutory ambiguity all the more, inasmuch as they may overvalue or overgeneralize from the experience and hardships of litigants before them (Eskridge and Ferejohn, 2002: 631). Chevron also introduced new constraints on the role of lawyers inside agencies, who like judges are normally generalists: they are only to pinpoint the range of legally reasonable interpretations but must allow experts and officeholders to make the actual policy choice (Givati and Stephenson, 2011; Magill and Vermeule, 2011: 1083). The logic of Chevron ’s quest to dampen the impact of the biases of judges and lawyers on agency statutory construction was carried forward by subsequent decisions like National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v Brand X Internet Services , 42 which, in freeing from the stare decisis of judicial precedent and of their own interpretations agencies that were delegated interpretive authority by Congress (Bressman, 2011), went ‘a step further than Chevron ’ (Craig, 2011: 18).…”

Section: The Behavioral Structure Of Administrative Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Debiasing regulators

2017

Common Law World Review

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Behavioral economics has revolutionized American legal scholarship in many areas of law, but not in administrative law, the law that regulates the regulators. This article theorizes that the administrative law doctrines developed by the Supreme Court of the United States strikingly resemble a system of ‘debiasing’ devices developed to counteract bureaucratic and judicial behavioral failures in just the areas that they matter most. A strong, alternative, justification may thus exist for the enduring paradox of American administrative law that administrators should be prepared to have their substantive decisions scrutinized by ‘hard look’ reviewing courts, while judges should be ready to defer to agencies on questions of statutory interpretation.

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The Shaping of EU Competition Law

Colomo

2018

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Judicial Deference to Inconsistent Agency Statutory Interpretations

Cited by 10 publications

References 25 publications

Regulatory agencies and courts: interactions between administration and justice

Regulatory agencies and courts: interactions between administration and justice

Debiasing regulators

The Shaping of EU Competition Law

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