Judgments under uncertainty: Representativeness or potential surprise?

Abstract

Tversky and Kahneman's (1983) account of conjunctive probability judgment in terms of the representativeness heuristic is questioned. Instead, potential surprise (Shackle, 1969) is proposed as an important mechanism underlying subjective probability judgment. Study 1 reveals that, consistent with Shackle's theory, probabilities assigned to conjunctions are predominantly determined by the magnitude of the smaller component event probability. Also consistent with Shackle, Study 2 shows that for disjunctions, this role is performed by the larger component. Study 3 again contrasts the relative roles played by the component events in determining the value assigned to the conjunction. The results of the study are consistent with two reasoning processes: one analytically based, in which due account is taken of both component events, the other heuristic in nature and consistent with Shackle's theory of potential surprise. The implications of these results for a range of different types of judgment, e.g. with regard to person perception, stereotyping, categorization, and typicality, are evaluated.

The conjunction fallacy, confirmation, and quantum theory: Comment on Tentori, Crupi, and Russo (2013).

“…This is because the disjunctive probability equals one minus the probability of the conjunction B and F , and the latter is predicted to produce a conjunction error because of incompatibility. Indeed, it has been found that disjunction errors are also obtained using the same events that produce conjunction errors (Morier & Borgida, 1984;Fisk, 2002;Yates & Carlson, 1986). Furthermore, another directly testable prediction of the QP model concerns conditional probabilities: The QP model must predict that p(B|F, L) ≥ p(B|L), because the QP model for the conjunction fallacy implies that B|F, L).…”

Counter-stereotypes reduce emotional intergroup bias by eliciting surprise in the face of unexpected category combinations

“…Ekman, 1972;Fisk, 2002;Izard, 1977;Plutchik, 1980;Roseman, 1996) which usually results in the interruption of ongoing thoughts and activities and motivates people to pay attention to the unexpected (e.g., Kunda et al, 1990;Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 1997;Ortony & Partridge, 1987;Schützwohl & Reisenzein, 1999). Distinct from emotions such as joy or fear, surprise does not presuppose the appraisal of the eliciting information as positive (motive-congruent) or negative (motive-incongruent), and the feeling of surprise is per se hedonically neutral rather than pleasant or unpleasant (Reisenzein, 2009).…”

Pleasurable Surprises: A Cross-Cultural Study of Consumer Responses to Unexpected Incentives

“…Some psychologists treat surprise as a cognitive process that involves beliefs about the likelihood of an event (Fiske 2002;Teigen and Keren 2003). Others view surprise as an emotion, on par with happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, and fear, because of its unique pattern of facial expressions (Ekman, Friesen and Ellsworth 1972).…”