Judgments of voluntary and physical causes in causal chains: probabilistic and social functionalist criteria for attributions

Abstract

Four experiments investigated judgments about voluntary human actions and physical causes that were embedded in causal chains ending in negative outcomes (e.g., a forest fire). Causes were judged for their explanatory quality, their effect on the probability of the outcome, and the extent to which they could be socially controlled. Results supported legal theorists' claim that voluntary actions are judged better explanations than physical causes. Indices derived from theories of probability change generally failed to predict the preference for voluntary actions. In contrast, this preference was mediated by the perceived extent to which voluntary versus physical causes may be brought under social control. These results suggest that causal explanation, at least within causal chains, is not driven solely by changes in the probability of an outcome when a cause is added, and that observers recognize the potential social function of explanations in drawing attention to socially controllable causes.

Acting knowingly: effects of the agent's awareness of an opportunity on causal attributions

“…This demonstration clarifies the findings of McClure, Hilton, and Sutton (2007), who showed that voluntary actions were preferred to physical events as causes. It also leads us to the principal objective of the present research: what explains this tendency to attribute greater causal importance to knowing actions?…”

When deserving translates into causing: The effect of cognitive load on immanent justice reasoning

“…Thus, the extent to which immanent justice attributions occur spontaneously remains unexamined. Nevertheless, research shows that much the same patterns in causal explanation can emerge whether people rate the explanatory quality of attributions or freely generate them (e.g., McClure, Hilton & Sutton, 2007), and similar results occur in the literature on how behaviors are described in situational versus dispositional terms (Douglas & Sutton, 2003). One interesting avenue for future research, then, would be to examine whether people spontaneously make immanent justice attributions.…”

“…Further, future research should establish that the present findings generalize when causal attributions are probed differently than in the current study (although previous research on causal attribution gives ground for optimism with respect to the current assessment of causal attribution, e.g., Hilton, McClure & Sutton, 2010;McClure et al, 2007). For example, it is possible to ask participants to rate the extent to which outcomes were "caused by," rather than the "result of," a person's prior conduct.…”

Judgments of Cause and Blame: Sensitivity to Intentionality in Asperger’s Syndrome

“…Making causal attributions about human actions is a fundamental aspect of everyday life, forming part of our efforts to comprehend and regulate our society. After major events, particularly negative ones, there is a desire to understand how they happened and who was responsible (Alicke 2000;Heider 1958;Hilton et al 2005;Kelley 1967;McClure et al 2007;Shaver 1985). Once this is established, it can then be determined whether an individual can be held accountable.…”