2015
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2015.1127288
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Judgment of blame in teenagers with Asperger's syndrome

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Cited by 21 publications
(23 citation statements)
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“…However, Steele et al ( 2003 ) found that children with ASD aged 4–14 failed to distinguish between intentional and accidental bad acts (e.g., failing to come to a planned meeting as a result of canceling the plan without telling or as a result of the bus breaking). Studies on ASD adults also showed that they judge an accidental harm both more punishable and more intentional compared to TD adults, suggesting a partial impairment in the ability to rely on intentions (Buon et al, 2013 ; see also Rogé and Mullet, 2011 ; Zalla and Leboyer, 2011 ; Salvano-Pardieu et al, 2015 ). Nevertheless, ASD school-aged children distinguish between a distressed victim and an individual in distress that however is not a victim (Leslie et al, 2006 ).…”
Section: The Relative Weight Of Intention and Outcome In The Judgmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, Steele et al ( 2003 ) found that children with ASD aged 4–14 failed to distinguish between intentional and accidental bad acts (e.g., failing to come to a planned meeting as a result of canceling the plan without telling or as a result of the bus breaking). Studies on ASD adults also showed that they judge an accidental harm both more punishable and more intentional compared to TD adults, suggesting a partial impairment in the ability to rely on intentions (Buon et al, 2013 ; see also Rogé and Mullet, 2011 ; Zalla and Leboyer, 2011 ; Salvano-Pardieu et al, 2015 ). Nevertheless, ASD school-aged children distinguish between a distressed victim and an individual in distress that however is not a victim (Leslie et al, 2006 ).…”
Section: The Relative Weight Of Intention and Outcome In The Judgmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although autistics do not seem to be impaired in evaluating intentional third-party harm-doings, they exhibit enduring deficits on more complex intent-based moral judgment tasks that require integration of information about mental states of the agents with the information about outcomes of these acts. In particular, they judge accidental harms more harshly, arguably due to their inability to form a robust representation of agent’s benign intentions due to ToM deficits 13 that can be weighted up against a strong negative emotional response stemming from the victim suffering 14 15 16 17 18 (but see Baez et al 19 ). Thus, this work is consistent with the profile of ASD 20 featuring preserved psychophysiological/emotional response to others’ affective states (affective empathy) but reduced cognitive understanding about others’ internal states (ToM).…”
Section: Moral Cognition In Autism: An Overviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although autistics do not seem to be impaired in evaluating intentional third-party harm-doings, they exhibit enduring deficits on more complex intent-based moral judgment tasks that require integration of information about mental states of the agents with the information about outcomes of these acts. In particular, they judge accidental harms more harshly, arguably due to their inability to form a robust representation of agent's benign intentions due to ToM deficits 13 that can be weighted up against a strong negative emotional response stemming from the victim suffering [14][15][16][17][18] (but see Baez et al 19 ). Thus, this work is consistent with the profile of ASD 20 featuring preserved psychophysiological/emotional response to others' affective states (affective empathy) but reduced cognitive understanding about others' internal states (ToM).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%