Judging mechanistic neuroscience: a preliminary conceptual-analytic framework for evaluating scientific evidence in the courtroom

Abstract

† Co-authors had equivalent input and are listed in alphabetical order.The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Preprint Forthcoming in Psychology, Crime and Law AcknowledgementsThe use of neuroscientific evidence in criminal trials has been steadily increasing.Despite progress made in recent decades in understanding the mechanisms of psychological and behavioral functioning, neuroscience is still in an early stage of development and its potential for influencing legal decision-making is highly contentious.Scholars disagree about whether or how neuroscientific evidence might impact prescriptions of criminal culpability, particularly in instances in which evidence of an accused's history of mental illness or brain abnormality is offered to support a plea of not criminally responsible. In the context of these debates, philosophers and legal scholars have identified numerous problems with admitting neuroscientific evidence in legal contexts. To date, however, less has been said about the challenges of evaluating the evidence upon which integrative mechanistic explanations that bring together evidence from different areas of neuroscience are based. As we explain, current criteria for evaluating such evidence to determine its admissibility in legal contexts are inadequate.Appealing to literature in the philosophy of scientific experimentation and theoretical work in the social, cognitive and behavioral sciences, we lay the groundwork for reforming these criteria and identify some of the implications of modifying them.

Achieving cumulative progress in understanding crime: some insights from the philosophy of science

“…The recent replication crisis in science has called attention to the fact that sometimes investigators working within the same field do not maintain the same standards. (See Baron and Sullivan, 2018;Haig, 2019;McGee and Farrington, 2019;Sullivan, 2015).…”

Neuroimaging and the Limits of Brain Imaging Techniques

“…In the case that the court wants to accept the neuroscientific evidence as a proof to determine whether the subject involved meets the criterion of mens rea. It is imperative for the court to possess an understanding of conceptual-analytic approach required for the evaluation of scientific evidence and to be sure, it is not rejected out of hand and that the evidence be analysed properly before the court makes it permissive in criminal trials, failure to analyse the evidence conceptually presages an undesired outcome (Baron & Sullivan, 2018).…”

Training for communication in forensic science

“…Courts are heightened spaces of meaning-making, where the weight that judges, and juries assign to scientific evidence guides For decades, science has played a major role in the justice system. Judges and juries are presented with scientific evidence commonly presented in courtrooms through expert testimony (8). whereby the expert is brought in to deliver highly scientific and technical information in specialist areas (9).…”

“…The use of vague language for example, can actually cater to the accuracy and precision that judges and juries expect, simply because of the credibility the expert witness is afforded (10). Judges have raised concerns about jury comprehension of expert testimony, their tendency to place too much weight on it, and their belief that science is incapable of being wrong (8). Yet, calls for researchers, academics, and criminal lawyers to reform the system have gone unanswered (12).…”

“…i (12,14). Others have pointed out issues related to the fact that most scientific evidence presented in courtrooms is correlational, not causal (8). Added to the complications introduced by the use of specialized lexicons, researchers have also shed light on the fact that reliability and validity are context specific, and that the acceptability of scientific tools must be determined on a case-by-case basis rather than being applied uniformly across the board (15).…”