Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency

Dorsch, Fabian

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225989.003.0003

Cited by 12 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…It is therefore necessary to provide an analysis of what it means for perceptions to appear to be relational from the inside. In this analysis, I rely heavily on my phenomenological description of what perceptual experiences are like in Dorsch, (2010a).…”

Section: The Impression Of Relationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, our knowledge-constituting belief that p and p → q provides us with a reason to be- 30 The same is true of colours, even if they turn out to be secondary qualities: which colour we see the apple as having is determined by which colour it actually possesses. But if colours are secondary qualities, which colour an object possesses depends again both on its reflectance properties and on how the human visual system works (Dorsch, 2009a). Assuming that our visual system does not change (or that colours are defined in a rigid way by reference to our current visual system), it follows that which colour we see the apple as having is (primarily) determined by which reflectance properties its surface has.…”

Section: The Impression Of Reason-provisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…not necessarily existing) objects. By contrast, relationlists about perception are likely to question whether hallucinations are transparent in the same sense as perceptions, given that they do -or should -maintain that we cannot really say much about the nature of hallucinations, at least on the basis of the evidence available to us from the inside(Dorsch, 2010a; Dorsch, 2013; Martin, 2004a; Martin, 2006). Hallucinations just (wrongly) seem to make us aware of external and existing objects.17 Velleman, (2000) describes this difference in terms of some attitudes regarding propositions as true, and others regarding them as to be made true,while Martin, (2002b) draws the contrast by reference to merely semantic representation (i.e.…”

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The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons

Dorsch¹

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

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This chapter argues for Phenomenal Rationalism about perceptual experiences: the claim that our basic awareness of reasons for perceptual belief is phenomenal and non-conceptual. The main idea is that, from the inside, perceptual experiences seem to be reason-giving insofar as they seem to be relations to, and determined by, external objects and their features. The argumentation centres partly on the claim that assuming the phenomenal presence of the relationality and determination of perceptual experiences provides the best explanation of why so many good philosophers were convinced of the soundness of the argument from hallucination. That we enjoy phenomenal access to reasons prior to any normative beliefs also helps to reconcile the Humean insight that infants (who lack concepts like ‘reason for’) can be motivated to act or form attitudes with the Kantian insight that motivation is a matter of recognizing and responding to reasons.

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Section: The Impression Of Relationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Impression Of Reason-provisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons

Dorsch¹

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

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“…12 12 But see e.g. Dorsch (2009), Dretske (2000) and Papineau (1999) for a position where the normative role of truth in believing and judging is questioned. …”

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“…However, in my view, the way of seeing things that critical pop‐out involves remains non‐conceptual. Critical pop‐out also works differently from Dorsch's (2009) idea that recognizing something as an epistemic reason is tantamount to phenomenologically experiencing its authority over relevant acts of judging. Critical pop‐out manifests itself in the acts of judging, i.e.…”

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What We Do When We Judge

Toribio¹

2011

Dialectica

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In this paper I argue on two fronts. First, I press for the view that judging is a type of mental action, as opposed to those who think that judging is involuntary and hence not an action. Second, I argue that judging is specifically a type of non-voluntary mental action. My account of the non-voluntary nature of the mental act of judging differs, however, from standard non-voluntarist views, according to which 'non-voluntary' just means regulated by epistemic reasons. In addition, judging is non-voluntary, I contend, because it is partially constituted by the exercise of a non-reason-governed skill. This skill, which I call 'critical pop-out', consists of an unreflective, often unconscious, ability to detect the kind of situations in which the reflective abilities that also partially constitute our acts of judging should be deployed. We are responsible for our judgments, I conclude, because in identifying such reflection-inviting situations, we reveal the kind of epistemic agents we are. †

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Mental Acts

Proust

2010

A Companion to the Philosophy of Action

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Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency

Cited by 12 publications

References 14 publications

The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons

The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons

What We Do When We Judge

Mental Acts

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