The Wiley Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making 2015
DOI: 10.1002/9781118468333.ch7
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Joint versus Separate Modes of Evaluation

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Cited by 8 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…While giving these instructions, the experimenter pointed to both the $1 bill and the stack of two $1 bills. Because a $2 reward could appear larger when one compares it to $1 (Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2003;Hsee and Zhang 2010;Hsee et al 2009Hsee et al , 2013Zhang 2014), we let participants in both conditions see the $2 reward with the $1 reward as a reference. In a pretest (N p 76) that used the same presentation formats, the subjective evaluation of the $2 reward did not vary across two reward conditions (on a 7-point scale of reward attractiveness: M uncertain p 5.27, SD uncertain p 1.35; M certain p 5.30, SD certain p 1.24; t !…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While giving these instructions, the experimenter pointed to both the $1 bill and the stack of two $1 bills. Because a $2 reward could appear larger when one compares it to $1 (Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2003;Hsee and Zhang 2010;Hsee et al 2009Hsee et al , 2013Zhang 2014), we let participants in both conditions see the $2 reward with the $1 reward as a reference. In a pretest (N p 76) that used the same presentation formats, the subjective evaluation of the $2 reward did not vary across two reward conditions (on a 7-point scale of reward attractiveness: M uncertain p 5.27, SD uncertain p 1.35; M certain p 5.30, SD certain p 1.24; t !…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Outcome uncertainty invites resolution, and as study 2 demonstrates, resolution does contribute to the reinforcing-uncertainty effect. Outcome variety introduces a list of alternative explanations: (a) hedonic adaptation (that varied outcomes are more resistant to hedonic adaptation than fixed ones; Frederick and Loewenstein 1999;Kahneman and Thaler 1991); (b) the contrast effect or reference-dependent preferences (that a good outcome appears better when a not-so-good outcome serves as the reference point; Hsee 1996;Morewedge et al 2009;Tversky and Kahneman 1991;Zhang 2015); and (c) variety seeking (that varied outcomes may be seen as more valuable than fixed outcomes; Fishbach, Ratner, and Zhang 2011;McAlister and Pessemier 1982;Simonson 1990). Do any of these "variety" explanations contribute to the reinforcing-uncertainty effect?…”
Section: Study 3: Ruling Out Alternative Explanationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This proposition stems from general-evaluability theory (Hsee, 1996; Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999; Hsee, Yang, Li, & Shen, 2009; Hsee & Zhang, 2010; Shen, Hsee, Wu, & Tsai, 2012; Zhang, 2016). According to this theory, when the value of a low-evaluability attribute appears in isolation (i.e., in the single-evaluation mode), people are sensitive to its sign (whether the value is positive or negative) but insensitive to its size (how large the value is), because sign is easy to evaluate independently, but size is hard to evaluate independently.…”
Section: Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%