Joint bandwidth allocation, data scheduling and incentives for scalable video streaming over peer-to-peer networks

Chen, Lin

doi:10.1007/s11042-013-1621-7

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…The English auction is the simplest auction type we found in the reviewed P2P systems [21,29,33,85,86,123,129,131,147]. This auction type generates high profits for the seller but results in overpaying, especially if bids are private.…”

Section: Auctionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive Mechanisms in Peer-to-Peer Networks — A Systematic Literature Review

et al. 2023

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Centralized networks inevitably exhibit single points of failure that malicious actors regularly target. Decentralized networks are more resilient if numerous participants contribute to the network’s functionality. Most decentralized networks employ incentive mechanisms to coordinate the participation and cooperation of peers and thereby ensure the functionality and security of the network. This article systematically reviews incentive mechanisms for decentralized networks and networked systems by covering 165 prior literature reviews and 178 primary research papers published between 1993 and October 2022. Of the considered sources, we analyze eleven literature reviews and 105 primary research papers in detail by categorizing and comparing the distinctive properties of the presented incentive mechanisms. The reviewed incentive mechanisms establish fairness and reward participation and cooperative behavior. We review work that substitutes central authority through independent and subjective mechanisms run in isolation at each participating peer and work that applies multiparty computation. We use monetary, reputation, and service rewards as categories to differentiate the implementations and evaluate each incentive mechanism’s data management, attack resistance, and contribution model. Further, we highlight research gaps and deficiencies in reproducibility and comparability. Finally, we summarize our assessments and provide recommendations to apply incentive mechanisms to decentralized networks that share computational resources.

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Section: Auctionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive Mechanisms in Peer-to-Peer Networks — A Systematic Literature Review

et al. 2023

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“…The auction mechanism is primarily used to ensure that good quality links are utilized in flow routing and replaces the tree‐based approaches for media distribution. In , a simple auction is designed to resolve the contention on bandwidth resources in each video overlay. Authors in model the problem of dynamic resource allocation in complex and autonomous networks as a double‐sided auction and find the upper bound of performance metrics through the classical optimization techniques.…”

Section: Review Of Prior Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game‐theoretic auction design for bandwidth sharing in helper‐assisted P2P streaming

Mostafavi

Dehghan

2015

Int J Communication

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SUMMARYVideo traffic offloading through the helper peers can significantly alleviate the server workload and enhance users' quality of experience. In this paper, the complex interactions of a number of helpers seeking to trade their bandwidth surplus in a peer-to-peer market are studied using non-cooperative game theory and double auction. In particular, a non-cooperative game is formulated among the helpers in which each helper can make a decision on the maximum amount of upload bandwidth surplus that it is willing to sell so as to maximize its utility function that reflects the tradeoff between the benefits from bandwidth sharing and its associated costs. Then, the price governing the bandwidth trading market between the helpers and peers is determined via a truthful double auction mechanism. To solve the game, an algorithm based on the best response dynamics is proposed using which helpers can reach a Nash equilibrium point. Simulation results exhibit that the proposed algorithm achieves significant performance improvements in terms of utility per selling helpers.

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“…Note that in contrast with many similar schemes, overhead calculation is only related to the design time of GaMe‐PLive. For example, in some schemes such as and , authors used auction method to address resource allocation in P2P video streaming that imposes a high overhead to exchange the proposed prices at the execution time periodically. Also in this approach, the traffic caused by finding chunk holders is significantly reduced via piggybacking required information on request or response messages.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

GaMe‐PLive: a new game theoretic mechanism for P2P live video streaming

Mahini

Dehghan

Navidi

et al. 2015

Int J Communication

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SUMMARYGaMe-PLive is a game theoretical framework for peer-to-peer live video streaming. Prevention of free-riding and minimization of loss rate in video data transmission are the important objectives of the proposed framework. GaMe-PLive is also extremely evasive about overhead of extra control messages exchange. At first, a static game with complete information between peers is described, which models the peer's interactive decision process for acceptance/rejection of a video chunk request. All peers repeatedly play this game during video playback periodically. Afterwards, the proposed game is analyzed to obtain a Nash equilibrium, which determines a peer's best strategic response for participation in the video chunk distribution. It will be proved that by applying some simple and feasible conditions, the desired objectives can be reached. The experimental results reveal that the proposed system has been successful in detecting free-riders with negligible false negative and false positive rate. Also, tolerable loss chunk percentage has been satisfied in all performed tests. Besides, an interesting social norm emerges in GaMe-PLive: Less participation leads to more missing chunks. GaMe-PLive will be proven to be quite resistant against cheating peers. The proposed framework displays high performance even if there is not a video server with high upload bandwidth.

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Joint bandwidth allocation, data scheduling and incentives for scalable video streaming over peer-to-peer networks

Cited by 8 publications

References 30 publications

Incentive Mechanisms in Peer-to-Peer Networks — A Systematic Literature Review

Incentive Mechanisms in Peer-to-Peer Networks — A Systematic Literature Review

Game‐theoretic auction design for bandwidth sharing in helper‐assisted P2P streaming

GaMe‐PLive: a new game theoretic mechanism for P2P live video streaming

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