Joint attention without recursive mindreading: On the role of second-person engagement

Felipe, León

doi:10.1080/09515089.2021.1917533

Cited by 19 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 74 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This simplicity of the straightforward account is the core of this paper's argument. Our last step underlines the significance of this argument, since it shows that the less parsimonious assumption of multi-level 24 See León (2021) for extensive references on the function of sharing in social cognition. For an account of the function of sharing in social cognition that can be shown to be substantially compatible with the straightforward view once the latter is clarified, see Seemann (2011).…”

Section: The Functions Of Shared Mental Statesmentioning

confidence: 86%

“…The advantage of the straightforward view over current psychological theories based on the assumption of multi-level recursive mindreading is easy to see. Both philosophers and developmentalists have argued that the existence of shared emotions, shared goals, and attention from as early as 3 months of age falsifies theories based on this assumption because the idea that infants so young may engage in multi-level recursive mindreading is untenable ( Fantasia et al, 2014a ; Rakoczy, 2018 ; Satne and Salice, 2020 ; León, 2021 ). This strong argument is corroborated by the reply of a developmental theorist like Rakoczy (2018 , pp.…”

Section: The Empirical Implications Of the Straightforward Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 24 See León (2021) for extensive references on the function of sharing in social cognition. For an account of the function of sharing in social cognition that can be shown to be substantially compatible with the straightforward view once the latter is clarified, see Seemann (2011) .…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Taking the mystery away from shared intentionality: The straightforward view and its empirical implications

Vincini

2023

Front. Psychol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Ordinary language in Western and non-Western cultures individuates shared mental states or experiences as unitary interpersonal events that belong to more than one individual. However, a default assumption in modern Western thought is that, in this regard, ordinary language is either illusory or merely metaphorical: a mental state or experience can belong to only one person. This assumption is called Cartesian eliminativism and is often taken to be foundational in psychology. It follows that any view that contradicts Cartesian eliminativism is a priori suspected of being “mysterious,” i.e., of not meeting scientific standards. This paper suggests that the very opposite may be the case. The straightforward view explains how individuals assemble and experience a shared mental state as a unitary whole whose components are distributed among the participants. The naturalistic advantages of such a view are brought to light by focusing on developmental science. Since it explains early shared emotions, goals, and attention merely by relying on domain-general, associative processes, the straightforward view is more parsimonious than current psychological theories. Indeed, it abandons the cumbersome postulates of (i) multi-level recursive mindreading and (ii) a special, conceptually elusive phenomenal quality. I outline the distinctive developmental predictions of the view and discuss how it accounts for the functions of shared mental states. As a reductionist, non-eliminativist approach, the straightforward view promises to be viable also for cognitive scientists who have so far worked within the Cartesian framework due to a lack of a rigorous and sufficiently developed alternative.

show abstract

Section: The Functions Of Shared Mental Statesmentioning

confidence: 86%

Section: The Empirical Implications Of the Straightforward Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Taking the mystery away from shared intentionality: The straightforward view and its empirical implications

Vincini

2023

Front. Psychol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…(69) Here Tomasello claims that joint attention involves a perceptual analogue of common knowledge, given presumably that bona fide common knowledge is too cognitively demanding for infants. Now, following a recent discussion by León (2021), I refine this line of argument by appeal to some specific results from the study of the development of social cognition, or theory of mind: our broad collection of cognitive skills for considering the mental lives of others.…”

Section: Direct Coordination and Perceptualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, an exciting and very recent trend in both philosophical and psychological work on the topic consists of developing the suggestion that joint attention holds partially in virtue of communication (Carpenter & Liebal 2011, Eilan 2015, Siposova & Carpenter 2019, León 2021. Let me intuitively motivate this suggestion, as the cited authors do, with some contrived cases, which will also serve to pre-theoretically introduce our phenomenon of interest.…”

Section: Conclusion 27 0 Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Joint attention and communication

Harder

2022

Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Joint attention occurs when two (or more) individuals attend together to some object. It has been identified by psychologists as an early form of our joint engagement, and is thought to provide us with an understanding of other minds that is basic in that sophisticated conceptual resources are not involved. Accordingly, it has also attracted the interest of philosophers.Moreover, a very recent trend in the psychological and philosophical literature on joint attention consists of developing the suggestion that it holds partially in virtue of communication:it is because we share our thoughts or feelings about an object that our individual attention becomes joint. This paper unpacks the communicative suggestion in a way that accounts for joint attention's basicness.

show abstract

What Matters to Others: A High-Threshold Account of Joint Attention

Bloom-Christen

2024

Topoi

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

If only implicitly, social anthropology has long incorporated joint attention as a research technique employed in what anthropologists call “the field”. This paper outlines the crucial role joint attention plays in anthropolgical fieldwork—specifically in Participant Observation—and advances the position that joint attention is a goal rather than a starting point of fieldwork practice. Exploring how anthropologists tentatively use attention as a methodological tool to understand other people’s lifeworlds, this paper draws parallels between Participant Observation and ordinary everyday interactions, thus teasing out a view of joint attention as a goal to be reached only by means of knowing what matters to others in the context of the lifeworld they inhabit.

show abstract

Joint attention without recursive mindreading: On the role of second-person engagement

Cited by 19 publications

References 74 publications

Taking the mystery away from shared intentionality: The straightforward view and its empirical implications

Taking the mystery away from shared intentionality: The straightforward view and its empirical implications

Joint attention and communication

What Matters to Others: A High-Threshold Account of Joint Attention

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About