Joint anti-attack scheme for channel assignment in multi-radio multi-channel wireless mesh networks

Abstract

Nowadays, multi-radio multi-channel wireless mesh networks have been widely exploited to provide high-speed Internet access. By assigning different channels, the interference between wireless mesh network nodes can be greatly reduced, leading to a better network performance. However, the channel assignment attacks have imposed a serious security problem, where the diverse messages, that is, Channel Usage Message (CUM), Channel Change Message (CCM), Channel Switch Operation (CSO) and Security Alarm Message (SAM), are often used to launch attacks by the malicious nodes in order to disturb the normal channel assignment and thus the overall network performance. In this paper, we propose a joint anti-attack scheme (JAS) against the channel assignment attacks. Our JAS is composed of four key components: CUM, CCM, CSO and SAM defense schemes to protect the channel assignment. The CUM defense scheme verifies the CUM messages and their sender. The CCM defense scheme employs three rounds of CCM verifications. Furthermore, three control messages are exploited by the CSO defense scheme. The SAM defense scheme offers two rounds of verification for the alarm messages. Moreover, we apply our JAS to a popular distributed channel assignment algorithm, that is, Hyacinth. Through extensive simulation, the performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated by comparing with SeCA and SmartC in terms of Goodput and additional overhead. Observed from the simulation results, our scheme is demonstrated to outperform the best-known secure channel assignment algorithms.

A survey on security vulnerabilities in channel assignment algorithms of multi‐interface wireless mesh networks

“…In , the possibilities of malicious assigner have discussed and in , some attacks were applied by the neighboring nodes. Additionally, the reliability of the assigner, the assignee, and the neighbor nodes has been challenged in . (ii) There is no verification in the most CA procedure at all.…”

“…The malicious node M lies about expected loads in channels 1 and 2 to newcomer nodes of G and D. Consequently, they choose these overloaded channels. This attack not only leads to improper channel decision, but it also deprives the victim node of regular data forwarding . Some schemes are designed to assign the channels after sensing considerable changes in measured values such as signal‐to‐interference‐plus‐noise ratio, traffic load, and link availability to name a few.…”

“…An adversary may receive the information and forward its modification information to the neighbors and the channel assigners .…”

“…A malicious node increases the number of neighboring nodes by sending the base information on behalf of some phony nodes or even some theoretical nodes that are not neighbors at all owing to environmental factors .…”

“…In this phase, nodes listen on channels and collect the required data from their x‐hop away neighbor nodes in case of decentralized or all nodes in centralized fashion. The collected data can be related to bandwidth, channel usage, hop‐count distance from the wired gateway, measured load, throughput of interfering neighbors, the assigned superimposed codes, and link status to name a few . The comprehensiveness and accuracy of data driven by this phase has direct impact on the node's ability to choose the best possible channel in the following decision‐making step.…”