Joint Action without Mutual Beliefs

Abstract

Joint action among human beings is characterized by using elaborate cognitive feats, such as representing the mental states of others about a certain state of affairs. It is still debated how these capacities evolved in the hominid lineage. I suggest that the consolidation of a shared practice over time can foster the predictability of other’s behavior. This might facilitate the evolutionary passage from inferring what others might know by simply seeing them and what they are viewing towards a mutual awareness of each other’s beliefs. I will examine the case for cooperative hunting in one chimpanzee community and argue that it is evidence that they have the potential to achieve common ground, suggesting that the consolidation of a practice might have supported the evolution of higher social cognition in the hominid lineage.

Frameless Folk Psychology

“…For the general goals of this paper, the importance of embodiment will not be considered: for while there is a relevant sense where embodied expressivity is strongly hindered online, it is not necessarily accurate to claim that human interaction online is disembodied (see Osler 2021 for a discussion). 4 I am not claiming that the capacity to make commitments is the only relevant aspect of joint action; nor is this the place to explore in depth the debate regarding the ontology of joint action(Bratman 2014;Gilbert 2013) or whether other animals are capable of normative practices or making commitments(Figà Talamanca 2021;Vincent, Ring, and Andrews 2018). I just want to state that, in the case at hand of members of the species Homo Sapiens, the capacity to establish and feel compelled by a common ground is particularly important.…”