Joint Action: Neurocognitive Mechanisms Supporting Human Interaction

Abstract

Humans are experts in cooperating with each other when trying to accomplish tasks they cannot achieve alone. Recent studies of joint action have shown that when performing tasks together people strongly rely on the neurocognitive mechanisms that they also use when performing actions individually, that is, they predict the consequences of their co-actor's behavior through internal action simulation. Context-sensitive action monitoring and action selection processes, however, are relatively underrated but crucial ingredients of joint action. In the present paper, we try to correct the somewhat simplified view on joint action by reviewing recent studies of joint action simulation, monitoring, and selection while emphasizing the intricate interrelationships between these processes. We complement our review by defining the contours of a neurologically plausible computational framework of joint action.

How social is error observation? The neural mechanisms underlying the observation of human and machine errors

“…Recently, it has been shown that the brain system involved in error commission, namely the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) (Ridderinkhof et al, 2004;Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2004), is also activated when we observe other humans making errors (Shane et al, 2008;de Bruijn et al, 2009;Newman-Norlund et al, 2009). This shared brain activity has led to the hypothesis that an analogous embodied simulation mechanism might be at hand at this more cognitive level, namely to understand each other's errors (van Schie et al, 2004;Bates et al, 2005;Bekkering et al, 2009). Here, we investigate whether shared activation in brain areas involved in error commission and error observation necessarily rely on simulation.…”

Can discrete joint action be synergistic? Studying the stabilization of interpersonal hand coordination.

“…Whether crossing a road with a group of individuals at a cross-walk, moving a table and chairs with friends or family, or shaking hands with a colleague, individuals frequently perform social behavioral coordination in a robust and flexible manner, with seemingly little or no effort. Despite it being well known that performing social motor activities is a fundamental property of ongoing human behavior (e.g., Bekkering et al, 2009; Marsh, Richardson, & Schmidt, 2009; Richardson, Marsh, & Schmidt, 2010; Riley, Richardson, Shockley, & Ramenzoni, 2011; Schmidt & Richardson, 2008) the exact nature of how coactors are able to carry out these motor acts remains incompletely understood. Several researchers have argued that the coordinated motor control that takes place during joint or social actions might be synergistic (Anderson, Richardson, & Chemero, 2012; Richardson et al, 2010; Riley et al, 2011).…”

Interlocutors-Related and Hearer-Specific Causes of Misunderstanding: Processing Strategy, Confirmation Bias and Weak Vigilance

“…This requires various (subconscious) acts like noticing if the hearer follows or understands. Monitoring depends on theory of mind abilities because speakers must reason about the mental operations hearers perform: they have to simulate hearers' mental actions internally in order to detect alleged interpretative problems (Perlis et al, 1998: 562;Bekkering et al, 2009;Shintel and Keysar, 2009). Indeed, people mentally represent what their interlocutors must be doing at a certain moment, thus aligning themselves with their interlocutors (Garrod and Pickering, 2009: 293-294), which facilitates anticipation of (re)actions (Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009: 358).…”